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In this study, six articles are devoted to an evaluation of the Soviet Union 50 years after the revolution of 1917—looking at Russia's internal situation and at her foreign policies in light of the past half century. Our introductory specialist considers Soviet foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States, and concludes that the U.S.S.R. may now be facing a basic foreign policy decision.

Soviet-American Relations: Conflict and Cooperation

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THE YEAR 1967 has witnessed a curious mixture of crisis and détente in Soviet-American relations. The United States conducts military operations against a Communist state which fights back with Soviet-supplied weapons; American and Soviet policies clash in the Middle East as the Arab states and Israel push their long-standing conflict to the stage of open warfare; at the same time both governments carefully limit the crises in avoidance of the risk of war; they continue to negotiate in search of a treaty to check the spread of nuclear weapons; and in Europe they observe a kind of truce which, without showing any signs of a real settlement, keeps tension at a relatively low level. This is not the old cold war, at least not in its familiar form of the 1950's and early 1960's. It is not rapprochement either: neither side has ceded on any major issue. Some call it détente. If so, it is but a partial détente, applying only to certain aspects of the relations of the two powers and marked by hesitations and distrust on both sides.

The origins of today's ill-defined and not

easily understood situation may be attributed to numerous changes in the international scene: the growth of nuclear weapons and the entry of Communist China into the nuclear club; the transition from a bipolar world system to one of greater complexity; the recovery and growing economic strength of Western Europe; the troubles of the third world, and especially the decline or disappearance of many of Moscow's favored leaders among the nonaligned; and the Chinese challenge to Soviet primacy among Communist and leftist movements all over the world. Above all, they lie in the period and the policies of Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev, and in the continuation or adaptation of those policies by his successors.

At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Khrushchev did more than expose and denounce Stalin. He also revised one of the central tenets of Leninism, that war between the Communist and the capitalist powers was inevitable. The forces of socialism were now so powerful, Khrushchev maintained, that they

could gain ultimate victory by means short of all-out war, although of course there was no guarantee that the imperialists might not in desperation have recourse to their nuclear arsenal. The Soviet leader was reflecting confidence born of his country's possession of hydrogen bombs, a confidence that was to be vastly inflated in the following year by the first Sputnik and the successful testing of ICBM's. But he reflected also an increasing Soviet appreciation of what H-bombs could do, and a recognition of the tacit understanding evident at the 1955 summit conference at Geneva that a general nuclear war, which would inevitably destroy both sides, had to be ruled out as an instrument of national policy.

"Peaceful coexistence between states with differing political and social systems" was the phrase under which Khrushchev launched his new policy toward the West. It was, indeed, a slogan, indicating new methods and new tactics but not an intention to negotiate settlements or normalize relations with the United States and the Western alliance. It was a slogan covering a new phase of the cold war.

That Moscow saw possibilities of realizing substantial gains by use of the new tactics was evident both in Europe and in the third world. In 1957, Khrushchev helped to whip up a crisis over Syria, during which he threatened Turkey with atomic destruction, and in 1958 he won an apparent victory when Iraq's pro-West government was overthrown and replaced by a regime which looked to the Communist world for support. In that same year, he opened his campaign against the Western position in Berlin, with what appeared to be an ultimatum to meet Soviet demands to abandon the city in six months or face an East German refusal, backed by Soviet force, to allow any access to Berlin at all.

INCONSISTENT POLICIES

Yet there was little consistency in Khrushchev's policies toward the United States. He did not push the Berlin crisis to the critical point in 1959. On the contrary, after an unsuccessful four-power conference on Germany, he came to the United States, toured the country spouting peace and friendship,

and created with President Dwight D. Eisenhower the genial "spirit of Camp David." Then in the following year, after the U-2 incident, he blew up the summit conference in Paris and cancelled his invitation to Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union. He clashed with United States policy in the Congo and made a circus of the U.N. General Assembly session by trying to make hay on the issue of colonialism. When John F. Kennedy came to the presidency in 1961, Khrushchev faced him with a new crisis over Berlin which again held the threat of war.

All this alternation between smiles and snarls reflected more than Khrushchev's mercurial temperament, although that was surely a contributing factor. The Soviet leaders were impelled by the idea of capitalizing on the momentum of their spectacular scientific and economic progress. At the same time, they were bedevilled by the widening rift with China, which was already evident to the outside world in 1958, when Moscow ignored Peking in dealing with the Middle East crisis of that year and then failed to give full support in China's confrontation with the United States over the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy. By 1960, the dispute was no secret to anyone. The difficulty for the Soviets was that the military balance had not in fact changed to the point where they could get the Western powers to accept any basic change in the *status quo* without pushing the situation over the brink into war. They were not prepared to face this prospect even for their own interests in Europe or the Middle East. How much less were they prepared to face it on behalf of Peking's desire for Quemoy, or Taiwan, or new gains in Southeast Asia?

While the Soviet Union and the United States pushed ahead with the development of both offensive and defensive weapons, there was always the possibility that a technical breakthrough or a substantial lead for one side in certain weapons could upset the balance and confer a decisive advantage. But the "space spectacles" staged by the Soviet Union, though they sent a ripple of alarm through the United States and produced concern over the supposed "missile gap," did not

in fact confer such an advantage or turn the tide of world developments in favor of socialism, as Communist parlance had it. The lengthy crisis over Berlin, like the earlier Hungarian crisis, proved that the territorial *status quo* in Europe could not be changed by mere threat; Khrushchev drew back from using force in 1961, as the United States had in 1956, since nuclear war was not an acceptable price. The Congo adventure confirmed what had already become apparent in the Middle East: that while the Soviet Union could make political gains by espousing the cause of anti-colonialism, it could not act decisively in such areas because the balance of military power on the local scene strongly favored the West.

The outcome of the daring gamble to install intermediate-range missiles in Cuba in 1962 confirmed both conclusions. Because the United States had all the military advantages in the Caribbean, and was prepared to take military action, the Soviets had only a choice between retreat and general war. The five years of successive crises demonstrated that the Soviet Union could not translate presumed or anticipated strategic superiority into political and diplomatic advantage. The United States and its Western allies, following policies which were largely defensive, were able to thwart Soviet moves through the combination of strategic deterrence and flexible conventional power, assisted by steady nerves.

THE BEGINNINGS OF DÉTENTE, 1963-1964

The last two years of the Khrushchev reign saw a definite drop in the temperature of crisis in Soviet-American relations, reflecting a Soviet reassessment of the military balance. Soviet policy became directed more to consolidating the *status quo* than to upsetting it. The Cuban encounter evidently convinced Khrushchev of the folly of risking nuclear war for whatever purpose and of the need for a certain stabilization of relations with the United States. At the same time, China's military incursion into India brought the Soviet Union into a position of supporting the latter against a "fraternal Communist state"; thereafter both Moscow and Washington

were providing arms to India in parallel if not concerted lines of policy.

Hence for the first time Khrushchev was willing to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban, which had been under negotiation at Geneva and at New York off and on since 1958. Significantly, the test-ban treaty was signed in Moscow by the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain on August 5, 1963, as Chinese delegates were leaving that city after a last-ditch attempt to patch up the Soviet-Chinese dispute broke down amid mutual recrimination. Khrushchev's rapprochement with the United States, marked by a series of agreements in 1963 and 1964 (establishment of the "hot-line" connection between Washington and Moscow, reciprocal measures to reduce production of fissionable material, and the ban on weapons in outer space), ran parallel to his growing concern with the challenge of China and his attempts to organize the Communist world against it.

The easing of the cold war after the Cuban crisis had been welcomed by the United States. President Kennedy and then President Lyndon Johnson did what they could to promote further progress in the field of arms control, even beyond the agreements mentioned above. Washington held some hope that the possibility of negotiation might also extend to the political problems of Europe and of Southeast Asia. But the Soviet idea of détente was strictly limited. Time and again Khrushchev had stated publicly that the policy of peaceful coexistence was a means of carrying on the struggle with the imperialists, not of compromising with them. The agreements made to lessen the risk of nuclear war were made for the purpose of conducting less dangerously and more effectively the political and economic competition. Thus it did not prove possible to make progress toward agreement on measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or on a comprehensive test ban (covering underground tests), although negotiations went forward on peripheral matters such as a consular treaty (signed on June 1, 1964) and a Moscow-New York air link.

The dispute with Peking, in which the Chi-

nese were not only making gains at Soviet expense in Asia and Africa but were also accusing Moscow of collusion with the imperialists, pushed the Soviets to even stronger moves against the West. In West Europe, the United States was up against a new situation in which the relaxation of tension and the diminishing concern of Europeans over the Soviet military threat was undermining NATO and offering new opportunities to a Soviet policy of dividing and weakening the West, though there were compensating advantages for the West in the centrifugal forces at work in East Europe. In the third world, there was no lessening of the conflict between the Soviet policy of supporting and arming "revolutionary" regimes, such as those in Indonesia and Egypt, and encouraging movements of "national liberation," and the American policy of promoting stability and trying to block the spread of Soviet or Chinese influence and control. A nerve point of this conflict was Vietnam, which was brought to center stage after both Kennedy and Khrushchev had passed from the scene.

It was a mark of Khrushchev's policy that Southeast Asia had no prominent part comparable to that of the Middle East or the Indian subcontinent. The Soviet Union had sent large quantities of arms to Indonesia, but it looked as if the reward for that largesse would fall to Peking rather than to Moscow, for the Sukarno regime and the Indonesian Communist party were then leaning to the Chinese side. As for Vietnam, although the Soviet press and official public utterances made the usual references to the aggressive acts of the American imperialists, they were in a relatively low key. Actually the Soviet Union did very little to support that particular "war of national liberation" following the agreement reached with the United States on the neutralization of Laos in 1962. It was apparent that the Soviet leadership was not averse to the American presence in Southeast Asia, since it provided a check to Chinese expansionism that Moscow could not provide.

THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Nikita Khrushchev's fall in October, 1964,

took place mainly because his domestic policies had aroused the antagonism of other powerful men within the leadership. On the international side, their objections were rather to the methods than to the substance of his conduct of foreign policy: his pushing the dispute with China toward a showdown at a world conference of Communist parties (at a time when the Chinese had succeeded in making inroads into Soviet control of the world movement); his personal dealings with foreign leaders and governments outside regular channels; and the general air of adventurism surrounding his diplomacy. But his policy of relative détente with the United States, under the banner of peaceful coexistence, seems not to have been an issue for those who brought about his downfall. The decision for the Cuban venture in 1962, so far as we can judge, had not been his alone. Other leaders, both civilian and military, had shared it; and others had supported the new and more conciliatory line which emerged from the lessons of that crisis.

The new leadership, with Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin in the top posts, was mainly concerned with carrying through needed reforms on the home front and consolidating its position. It tried to call a halt to the public polemics with China, but the Chinese found out soon enough that there was no change in the substance of the Soviet position and they refused to stop or tone down their own polemics. In other aspects of Soviet foreign policy there was a general stock-taking and reassessment. "Peaceful coexistence" remained as the official description of policy toward the United States and the West. There were, however, certain signs that Khrushchev's breezy informality had been replaced by a new reserve and a rigidity of outlook.

The new regime laid increasing stress on three aspects of American policy it considered hostile to the Soviet Union's interests: the projected nuclear multilateral force (M.L.F.) for NATO, in which West Germany would participate; American insistence that the Soviet Union help pay for U.N. peacekeeping operations; and the increasing American mili-

tary involvement in Vietnam. Soviet-American conversations at the time of the U.N. General Assembly session of 1964, including a talk between Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and President Johnson, produced no change in fixed positions. An American inquiry about possible Soviet restraint on Hanoi's support of guerrilla activity in South Vietnam brought the retort that the first move should be the withdrawal of U.S. forces, then numbering some 20,000 "advisers."

President Johnson's State of the Union message in January, 1965, contained the judicious mixture that had become standard in utterances from Washington: expression of the desire for peace and affirmation of resolve to carry out the policies deemed necessary to protect American and free world interests. It spoke of building bridges to the Soviet Union and East Europe (a policy first enunciated in a speech the President had made in May, 1964),¹ of hope for mutual understanding, of the desirability of more high-level visits and increased communication and trade. The immediate Soviet reaction, judging from the press, was negative. *Izvestia* called it lip service to peace while America continued with dangerous and aggressive policies in Vietnam and elsewhere. But the Soviet leaders were biding their time, not jumping rapidly toward either a hard or soft line toward America.

They were in a particularly delicate position with respect to China. They did not accept the Chinese policy of militant confrontation with America, but they were extraordinarily sensitive to Chinese criticism of their "revisionism," "betrayal of socialism," and "toadying to the imperialist enemy." The Chinese were challenging their control of the world Communist movement, winning over some Communist parties and causing splits in others. The Soviet leaders had to show some results from their more moderate line, in the form either of concessions by the West or of gains for the cause of communism or the "national-liberation movement"; otherwise they would lose ground to Peking. In February, 1965, Premier Kosygin paid a visit

to Hanoi, apparently seeking to strengthen Soviet influence there at the expense of China's. It was precisely at this juncture that the United States began its steady bombing of North Vietnam, a move which Moscow could only take as an open attempt to humiliate the Soviet Union. Shortly afterward, President Johnson took the decision to build up American forces in Vietnam and commit them to combat.

CAN DÉTENTE AND THE VIETNAMESE WAR COEXIST?

The Vietnam question illustrated how the pattern of international relations had changed in the past few years. At the height of the cold war the bilateral conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, each at the head of its own alliance system, conditioned the outlook and the decisions of both sides. But the ever-widening Soviet-Chinese rift and the general loosening of alliance systems made the situation more complex. The United States remained wedded to a policy of containment of Communist expansion in Asia, whether the push came from the Soviet Union, China, a lesser state such as North Korea or North Vietnam, or a "liberation front" such as appeared in South Vietnam. In its commitment to defend South Vietnam, the United States government undertook to assist that country to overcome the threat to its independence, in the conviction that the establishment of Communist power there would upset the balance of power in Southeast Asia and endanger the security of the United States and other free world countries.

The main threat in the background came obviously from Communist China, which was supporting the efforts of Hanoi and of the Vietcong guerrillas (the National Liberation Front) and presumably would harvest the strategic benefits of their victory. But the fighting was being done by Vietnamese in South Vietnam, and it was against them that the American military effort was directed. The decisions to bomb North Vietnam and to intervene with United States armed forces were taken to prevent the defeat of the South Vietnamese army by Vietnamese Commu-

¹ *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, June 15, 1964, pp. 922-924.

nists. They were taken in the expectation that Communist China would not intervene with its own forces, a calculation which proved correct, but otherwise virtually without regard to the general state of United States-Chinese relations, already a state of almost total hostility without actual war. They were also taken with very little regard to the state of United States-Soviet relations which, as we have seen, were marked by a measure of détente and by a hesitant but still significant search for areas of common interest in preventing war.

The direct and rapidly growing military involvement of the United States in Vietnam could not but affect Soviet-American relations. North Vietnam was a Communist state, a member of the "socialist camp." Could the Soviet Union, with its pretensions to be the leader of the camp, stand by and do nothing while that state was being directly attacked by the American "imperialists," especially after all that had been said about supporting wars of national liberation? Although not prepared to engage in war with the United States, the U.S.S.R. could and did send large quantities of weapons to North Vietnam to help in its defense against the air attacks. That this aid, significant as it was, was not sufficient to prevent the bombing raids or induce the United States to stop them merely added to Soviet frustration, which was immediately translated into stronger press attacks on the United States and a distinct chilling of the entire atmosphere between the two countries.

The war in Vietnam, however, brought certain advantages to Soviet diplomacy. As the United States became increasingly isolated on the issue, not only in the third world but among its allies as well, the Soviets could play upon the divisions in the Western community. Here the anti-American line of French President Charles de Gaulle, especially his strictures on American policy in Vietnam, pro-

vided an opening which the Soviets could not fail to exploit.

Using the themes of peace and of Europe's independence of the United States, they tried to influence the decisions of governments and the attitudes of the peoples. By mid-1965, they were mounting a real propaganda campaign to the effect that the United States, and especially President Johnson, had adopted a policy of increasing tensions and creating a war psychosis. The line was that the Soviet Union, itself dedicated to peaceful coexistence, had hoped for improved relations with the United States on that basis, but the American President had chosen the course of militant anticommunism in word and deed, a course which could lead only to war. The "aggression" in Vietnam, the dispatch of United States forces to the Dominican Republic, the insistence on a NATO arms plan (M.L.F.), which would eventually enable a militarist and "revanchist" West Germany to secure nuclear weapons, the revival of the Dulles policy of cold war and "liberation" aimed at the German Democratic Republic and at all socialist countries—all this was cited to show that American imperialism bore the responsibility for the deterioration of relations and the dangers to peace all over the world.²

Was that campaign intended only to turn world opinion against the United States? Or was it also a warning to Washington that Moscow would strike back in some way unless the United States changed its course? Actually, the United States was trying its best to foster more normal and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. The President suggested joint ventures in science and medicine. William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, wrote in a published article that a serious effort should be made to reach agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.³ The Administration and friendly senators refrained from pushing for a Senate vote on ratification of the Soviet-American consular treaty, fearing strong congressional criticism on internal security grounds (J. Edgar Hoover had opposed the treaty) and not wanting to spoil the

² See especially the *Tass* statement of May 21, 1965, Press Release No. 21, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington; and interviews of American industrialist Cyrus Eaton with Kosygin and Anastas Mikoyan, *The New York Times*, May 28, 1965.

³ "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1965, pp. 587-601.

chances for progress on other matters. Washington had even had some hope that the Soviet government would help to find the way to a negotiated solution on Vietnam, as a means of thwarting China, building Soviet influence in Hanoi, and avoiding the dangers of a wider war in Asia. The stepping up of the war on the American side, however, apparently made a stronger impression in Moscow than the appeals for cooperation. The result was more vituperation, more Soviet weapons for North Vietnam, and no expression of willingness to help reach a negotiated solution. But were the strong public statements a precise reflection of the top Soviet leaders' views?

The rigidity of the Soviet position was due in large part to the competition with China. There was still another consideration, the embarrassing question whether the Kremlin had enough influence in Hanoi to bring about any negotiation that could succeed, especially since it had no influence at all on Peking. If not, it would be foolish to try. It was interesting that when United States Ambassador-at-large W. Averell Harriman talked with Kosygin in July, 1965, he apparently gained the impression that the latter did not wish the Vietnam issue to cut off all cooperation between the two powers; and especially that the Soviet Union was interested in a nonproliferation agreement though insisting it would not be possible unless the M.L.F. project was abandoned.

By the end of 1965, Soviet-American relations were close to the freezing point, as Brezhnev had put it in a major speech to the Communist Party's Central Committee.⁴ Premier Kosygin, in an interview with James Reston, renewed the sharp public attacks on American policy, saying there could not possibly be any agreement on anything until the United States withdrew from Vietnam and stopped its policy of arming West Germany with nuclear weapons and setting the Germans against the Soviet Union.⁵ There

was no doubt that the Soviet leaders took both these issues, Vietnam and Germany, with the utmost seriousness. But their public discourse on them, which in mid-1966 reached a crescendo of denunciation of imperialism and insistence that American policies must be totally reversed if there were to be a chance for more normal relations, did not necessarily reflect the discussion going on in the inner councils of the Soviet regime.

Washington, indeed, appeared still to believe that Moscow really hoped for a settlement in Vietnam and might undertake a mediatory role. The failure of the Russians, however, to produce any results during the long 37-day pause in American bombing early in 1966 left the impression that they either could not or would not do so. In Europe, the United States had already dropped the M.L.F. project, a move calculated to please the Russians although it was done not so much because they opposed it as because only the Federal Republic of Germany, of all the allies, regarded it with any enthusiasm, and it was dividing NATO instead of pulling it together.

THE POLICY OF BUILDING BRIDGES

In the latter half of 1966, President Johnson increased his efforts to keep the channels open to Moscow, even as he increased the size and scope of the American military involvement in Southeast Asia and refused to consider any cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On August 26, he made a strong appeal for progress on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. He seemed to be putting a *détente* with the Russians ahead of the interests of our European allies when he said, "At the heart of our concern in the years ahead must be our relationship with the Soviet Union."⁶ In an interview published in *Amerika*, the U.S.I.A.'s Russian-language magazine distributed in the Soviet Union, he brought the same points home to the Soviet public.

Then came his speech of October 7 to a group of newspaper editors in New York,⁷ apparently intended to serve the same purpose as President Kennedy's famous *Ameri-*

⁴ *Pravda*, September 30, 1965.

⁵ *The New York Times*, December 8, 1965.

⁶ *Department of State Bulletin*, September 19, 1966, pp. 410-413.

⁷ *Ibid.*, October 24, 1966, pp. 622-625.

can University speech of 1963, which, with its call to Russians and Americans for a shift in attitudes away from the cold war, had opened the way to the earlier period of détente. President Johnson outlined steps toward reconciliation with the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe, including immediate reduction of some of the barriers to trade and his announced intention to press for legislative authority to extend most-favored-nation treatment to European Communist countries in addition to Poland and Yugoslavia, which already had it. He mentioned the possibility of mutual balanced cutbacks of troop strength in Germany. His main theme was the need for steps by both East and West to bring greater unity and security to Europe. Significantly, the President did not give priority to the reunification of Germany. He did not mention the M.L.F. or anything like it. And his proposals for closer ties between East Europe and the West he put forward in the framework of Soviet approval, a far cry from "liberation."

The Soviet government showed no great enthusiasm for the Johnson appeal. Brezhnev himself publicly ridiculed it. Yet quietly, in a number of ways, the two powers were taking some small steps. The Soviets released an American citizen they had been holding. Soviet-American talks on Moscow-New York airline services were resumed. Negotiations on a treaty covering space exploration went forward. At a White House meeting on October 10, 1966, Johnson and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko discussed the possibilities of progress on the nonproliferation treaty. All this was not spectacular. Neither side modified its position on Vietnam or Europe. But negotiation was going on, indicating that Vietnam had not become a total barrier to cooperation, even though high Soviet leaders were continuing to say that it was.⁸

Indeed, during Kosygin's visit to Britain in February, 1967, he showed interest in approaching a settlement through the ending

of American bombing of North Vietnam matched by some gesture of deescalation on the part of Hanoi. With no sign from Hanoi, Russia would make no move with Britain, the other cochairman, to reconvene the Geneva conference of 1954. But Moscow still stood, apparently, on the position that if the United States would stop the bombing, negotiations would become possible.

Such was the uncertainty in Soviet-American relations that signs of cordiality alternated with angry statements; serious negotiations proceeded side by side with Soviet protests over American damage to Soviet ships in Haiphong harbor or American protests over Soviet harassment of American ships on the high seas. Much of the uncertainty was on the Soviet side, evidently because there were conflicting priorities, and probably conflicting views, within the Soviet establishment. As on the American side, relations with the rival power did not exist in a vacuum but in connection with other pressing concerns.

One major preoccupation of the post-Khrushchev leadership was the need to regain the dynamism of economic growth; hence the reforms in agricultural policy and the experimentation with new methods in the organization of industry. The need to devote attention and resources to the domestic economy led to certain conclusions for policy toward America: to forgo adventures which could lead to war, to avoid a costly arms race, and to keep open the lines of trade, communication and educational exchange with the West, so that the technological gap could be narrowed. The domestic pressure for a rising standard of living, to which the leaders wished to respond, also tended to push them in the same direction.

Another major preoccupation was China. The gulf between Moscow and Peking seemed to be growing wider and deeper. The Soviet Union had regained some of the ground lost to the Chinese in the world Communist movement and among the non-aligned countries, but was still extraordinarily sensitive to the Chinese charges that it was guilty of such sins as revisionism, return to

⁸ See statement of Leonid Brezhnev at a Soviet-Polish friendship meeting in Moscow, *Pravda*, October 16, 1966.

capitalism, and collusion with the imperialists. Pragmatic as the Soviet leaders had become in their conception of Soviet national interests, Peking's campaign tended to drive them away from cooperation with the United States.

In the long run the Chinese challenge might loom so great as to force the Soviets to seek such cooperation on a broad basis. It had already produced some agreement in the field of nuclear weapons, as well as parallel policies in the Indian subcontinent, demonstrated anew in the U.N. action to halt the India-Pakistan war in the autumn of 1965 and in Kosygin's successful mediation at Tashkent in early 1966, which Washington applauded. But the main effect of China on Soviet foreign policy was to push it toward greater activity on behalf of revolutionary, nationalist and anti-Western forces throughout the world. It was virtually impossible for Soviet leaders even to seem to be abandoning to the Chinese the causes of national liberation and world socialism, without throwing into question their own beliefs and the foundations of their own power in Russia. And there was always the hope that the struggles within China would bring to the top an anti-Mao, moderate faction which would wish to reknit the ties with Moscow.

A third major concern was security. In the military balance with the United States the position of the Soviet Union, despite the general recognition of mutual deterrence, was one of strategic inferiority. Soviet military men, and others as well, were desirous of closing that gap by increasing offensive missile strength, installing an antimissile defense, building up naval and other capabilities for limited action abroad, and searching for a major scientific breakthrough in weapons. A policy of hard confrontation with the United States seemed to require some or all of these measures, but every stride along that road would take resources away from the civilian economy, and if the result were to provoke the United States into extraordinary efforts to increase its own armaments, the gain for Soviet security might be little or nothing. Still, given what in Soviet eyes

were hostile and dangerous policies of the United States in Vietnam, the Middle East and elsewhere, the pressure to speed the arms buildup was not easy for any Soviet leader to resist.

President Johnson, in his State of the Union message of January 10, 1967, indicated that the United States had decided to defer deployment of an antimissile defense system in the hope that the Soviet Union, which had already taken the first steps toward such a system, would follow. The new American ambassador, Llewellyn Thompson, arriving for his second tour of duty in Moscow the next day, carried a personal letter making this point, among others, directly to the Soviet government. The latter then proposed broadening the talks to include offensive missiles, to which the United States agreed, but there were no signs of rapid progress toward serious negotiation.

Meanwhile, the Johnson Administration pushed forward on the home front with two items which required congressional action, the consular treaty and the East-West trade bill. The former had been awaiting a vote on ratification in the Senate ever since the Foreign Relations Committee endorsed it in 1965, while the trade bill had been bottled up for many months in the House Committee on Ways and Means. Not of the highest importance in themselves, both were regarded as symbols of the President's policy. Overcoming the opposition of those who stressed the dangers of increased Soviet espionage and those who wanted no treaty at all with a country supplying weapons to the enemy in Vietnam, a bipartisan Senate majority of 66 to 28 finally ratified the consular convention on March 16, 1967. The trade bill, however, remained under discussion in committees and was not brought to the floor of either house.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Thus, the state of the Soviet-American détente and the fate of Johnson's bridge-building efforts remained shrouded in uncertainty at the time a new storm blew up in the Middle East. It looked at the start like

just another Arab-Israeli crisis of incidents and reprisals, of which there had been many, without war, since the Sinai-Suez affair of 1956. But during May of 1967, it developed momentum when the United Arab Republic, pointing to the danger of an imminent attack by Israel upon Syria, moved large forces into Sinai, demanded the recall of the U.N. Emergency Force stationed there, and declared the Gulf of Aqaba closed to Israeli ships and others carrying goods to or from Israel. Not everything is known about Moscow's role in these events or what the Russian leaders expected to happen. They did have a considerable stake in Syria, from which raids and sabotage had been carried on in Israel and which was in danger of some heavy act of reprisal by Israeli forces; they were also concerned about the position and prestige of their principal friend and client in the Arab world, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, currently at a low point owing to the unending war in Yemen and a shaky economy at home.

Soviet reports, apparently, played some part in influencing Nasser to act as he did, but that the succession of moves was jointly planned in advance or as they unfolded seems doubtful. Both Cairo and Moscow had an interest in a smashing political victory over Israel, the "reactionary" Arab states, and the West. Yet the Soviets did not contemplate an Arab-Israeli war, nor did Abdel Nasser, except perhaps in those days between the declaration of the blockade on May 22 and the Israeli offensive of June 5, when all Arab leaders were dizzy with success and carried away by the popular euphoria they themselves had created. The lightning Israeli victories, of course, punctured the Arab balloon; and the Soviet Union, as patron and supplier of arms to the Arab states, saw its own prestige suffer accordingly.

The Middle East crisis brought to the fore some of the political and military considerations lying at the heart of Soviet-American relations. First and foremost was the fact that neither wished to become directly involved in the fighting or to allow it to develop into armed confrontation between

themselves. This conviction on each side was communicated to the other by the "hot line." The Soviet Union, accordingly, stood by while the Arabs went down to defeat, then joined the United States in the U.N. Security Council in calling for a cease-fire. Whether the United States would have done the same if Israel were losing is another question; it was not tested in practice. Secondly, because the Soviet Union could not challenge the United States Sixth Fleet or United States air and potential land power in the eastern Mediterranean area, it could not intervene there without facing the near certainty of more effective intervention by American forces and consequent grave risks of nuclear war. The military equation also restricted the scope and efficacy of its political action and diplomacy. The third lesson was the manifest danger of commitments to small states where local conflicts cannot easily be contained and can draw in the great-power patrons against their own vital interest in global peace.

For the Soviet Union, the Middle East crisis forced some hard choices. The immediate decision, to avoid military involvement, was quickly made; the attempt at the United Nations to force Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab territories was merely a not very successful effort to recoup politically what the Arabs had lost on the field of battle. On the other hand, the situation was not all black for the Russians. The crisis shook the entire Western position in the Middle East, as Arab governments in their rage and frustration broke diplomatic relations and struck

(Continued on page 241)

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“... the Soviets [are] engaged in a two-sided struggle over Europe. On the one hand, concerted efforts are being made . . . to encourage West European self-assertion. . . . On the other hand, there are attempts . . . to maintain the cohesiveness of the East European Soviet sphere.” As this author sees the situation, “There is an element of contradiction in these two policies.”

Soviet Russia and the Two Europes

By STEPHEN S. ANDERSON

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SINCE WORLD WAR II, two superpowers have been engaged in a vast struggle for influence and primacy, ranging all around the globe. One of the crucial arenas of that conflict has been Europe; for both America and the Soviet Union have recognized that this rich, diversified, and increasingly well-developed portion of the world constitutes an important key—perhaps *the* most important one—to the outcome of the power struggle between them. For either superpower to “win” Europe would be a disaster for the other.

This struggle *over* Europe is a new experience for both nations, for in past days of lesser power each had tended rather to struggle *against* Europe. In the American case, it was the self-assertiveness of a dynamic transplant from Europe, striving to free itself of parental traditions, institutions and conflicts. In the Russian case, it was a struggle born of the fear and envy of a technologically and culturally less-developed peripheral area of Europe itself, an area which, following the two-century hiatus of Mongol domination in the late Middle Ages, could never quite make up its mind whether it was part of the Western world, or a bridge between the East and West; whether its historical mission was to reintegrate itself with Europe, or to supersede and surpass Europe.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 united

these two strands of Russian thought regarding Europe. The radical, socialist transformation of Russian society would at one and the same time transmit Marx’s revolutionary message to the Eastern, unindustrialized world, and galvanize Europe’s quiescent proletariat to its historically-determined role. But in the familiar pattern, this was still a struggle *against* Europe, against the “outworn” economic, social and political structure of the leading nations of Europe. Where the Czars had battled against the corrosive “liberalism” of European bourgeois doctrines, the commissars now fought the “reactionary” influences of those same doctrines.

Europe, of course, failed to ignite to the spark of the Bolshevik Revolution, and during the interwar period the new Soviet leadership, first under Lenin and then under Stalin, gradually reconciled itself to a state of self-imposed seige in which the Soviet Union sought desperately to achieve rapid industrialization by coercion and terror, while Europe spun headlong toward the internecine conflagration of World War II.

The war changed the picture radically. Europe was transformed by war-wrought devastation from an immediate threat to Soviet security into a power vacuum, susceptible to Soviet penetration. Even while the war was on, Stalin was making plans to increase Soviet influence over those portions of Europe

most accessible to Soviet power: the Baltic states, East Central Europe and the Balkans. In the early postwar years, Stalin moved rapidly to consolidate the Soviet advantage in those areas. These actions, and the assumed danger that Soviet influence would spread further westward, prompted United States intervention and, by 1947, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan formalized the already existing superpower struggle over Europe.

Europe was quickly divided into Soviet and American spheres. The dividing line ran through Germany, which neither superpower could permit to fall—reunited and potentially the most powerful nation in Europe—into the other's hands. The Soviet sphere was, of course, tightly controlled from Moscow, sovietized institutionally, and shamefully exploited in the interests of Soviet recovery; while in the American sphere the emphasis was placed upon recovery and the reconstruction of prewar political and economic institutions within the framework of American advice and aid. In the last analysis, however, Europe had become a divided arena of the larger competition between the United States and Soviet Russia.

A CHANGED WORLD SCENE

All of this took place nearly 20 years ago. In the succeeding two decades, vastly important changes have occurred: in divided Europe, in Soviet-American relations, in the world at large. The development of weapons of mass destruction has given the United States and Soviet Russia capacities for mutual annihilation which impel them to avoid head-on confrontations and to seek less dangerous modes of competition. At the same time, these capabilities seriously undermine their ability to guarantee the security of other nations within their spheres. Polish leaders are as unlikely to believe that the Soviets will sacrifice Moscow in defense of Warsaw as France's leaders are to believe that the Americans will sacrifice New York or Washington for Paris.

To the east, the rise of China as a dynamic and potentially aggressive state with deep

grievances against both the United States and Soviet Russia has tended to divert the attention of both superpowers from Europe. This is more obvious in the case of the United States, which has moved dangerously close to war with China in its Southeast Asian policy but Russia, too, has increasingly been forced to conduct her relations with Europe, particularly East Europe, within the context of her conflict with China.

In Europe itself, a process of long-term stabilization seems to be occurring. The Communist regimes originally implanted (with the exception of Yugoslavia) by Soviet influence or intervention have gradually put down roots and have achieved some degree of legitimization. With legitimization has come a growing commitment by these regimes to national—as opposed to Soviet—interests and perspectives. Where the Soviet leadership could once assume unquestioning obedience from its East European satellites, it must now frame and justify its policies within the rhetoric of mutual advantage and common interest. In West Europe, the process of economic and political recovery and self-assertion has been accompanied by a second, extremely important phenomenon: supranational European integration. This latter trend was originally urged on West Europe by the United States which saw in it a method of reducing old tensions among the nations of West Europe and making the area as a whole more resistant to Soviet pressure.

In the late 1950's, however, European integration began to assume an exclusive and even anti-American character, manifest particularly in the six-nation European Common Market and the decline of NATO. These trends inevitably undermined the viability of the American concept of a larger Atlantic alliance linking America and West Europe. With these changes in the internal structures of both East and West Europe came an increase and a broadening of the relations between the "two Europes," particularly in the realms of trade, cultural exchange, and even diplomacy. Thus, by the mid-1960's, the relatively clear-cut and seemingly rigid division of Europe into Soviet and American

spheres is giving way to a much more fluid and unpredictable situation. The struggle over Europe is by no means ended, but it is assuming new forms in which Europe itself or, better, "the nations of Europe," are capable of playing far more active and autonomous roles.

What, then, can be said of current Soviet policy toward Europe, East and West? How have these changes affected it? Where does the Soviet Union stand, 50 years after the revolution that was to have transformed Europe?

Two points should be made at the very outset of any analysis of the current situation. The first is that Europe is still divided. Nothing that has been said above should suggest that Europe's bifurcation is not still the overriding feature of her political topography. Change is occurring, and the outlines of a very different European arrangement are visible, but much more change will have to occur before one can write definitively of a re-integrated Europe. A concomitant of this fact is that the Soviet and American presences are still strong and evident in their respective spheres. Both superpowers maintain armed forces in most, although not all, of their allies' territories, both are linked to their spheres by military and political commitments, both play major, even overriding, roles in the economies of their spheres.

A second point concerns Germany, of which too little has thus far been said. The future of Germany is the issue which, more than any other, is a focal point of concern for all Europeans. Divided, Germany constitutes a constant threat to order and security in Europe, because of the tensions that inevitably exist between the two halves. United, judging from past performance in two world wars, she would be equally dangerous. This poses a very real dilemma for which no one, in Europe or out, has found a solution, unless it be the supranational integration towards which Europe as a whole may be groping. For the present, however, Germany is the problem par excellence, which underlies the important and

long-range discussions of Europe's future.

THE BUCHAREST DECLARATION

Having recognized these two points, let us now consider current Soviet policies toward West and East Europe, respectively. During the past year and a half, Soviet diplomacy has made a concerted effort to normalize and improve relations with major West European nations, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany. The July, 1966, meeting of the Warsaw Pact nations—that is, of the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania—may be regarded as the beginning of this effort. This conference issued a joint communiqué, now referred to in Soviet bloc circles as the Bucharest Declaration,¹ which called for an all-European conference (excluding the United States) to deal with and settle outstanding European problems, a liquidation of the two European military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), a merging of the West European Common Market with the East European Common Market (Comecon), and the recognition by the West European nations of the sovereignty and legitimacy of Walter Ulbricht's German Democratic Republic. This was a big order, and the Soviets surely had no expectation that it would be accepted in the West in its entirety. Its main significance was as a backdrop, a point of reference for the diplomatic initiatives to follow.

Shortly before the Bucharest conference, French President Charles de Gaulle had visited the Soviet Union, where he was accorded every honor, traveled extensively, and conducted long talks with Soviet leaders. Later that year, following the Bucharest Declaration, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin reciprocated with a nine-day state visit to France, during which he constantly alluded to the advantages of Soviet-French collaboration and the dangers of American political and economic hegemony. Great Britain has also been the particular object of Soviet diplomatic attentions. Prime Minister Harold Wilson has traveled twice to Moscow in the past year and a half and in February, 1967, Kosygin journeyed to England for extensive

¹ For excerpts from this declaration, see pp. 236ff. of this issue.

talks with the British leader. Shortly before that, another Soviet official, President Nikolai Podgorny, had conferred with Pope Paul in Rome. The Austrian capital was also favored with visits from two Soviet leaders.

The basic theme of all these talks was Soviet-West European rapprochement, in terms of the advantages of increased trade, technological cooperation, and cultural exchange. While admittedly this was not a new theme, the urgency with which it was pressed by the Soviet delegations *was* new. Moreover, the time was opportune, for it coincided with growing European desires, especially in France and England, to play a role in international affairs that would be clearly independent of the United States. It also coincided with growing European apprehension over the United States Southeast Asian policy and the possibility of an American involvement with China which might force the West European nations to take positions which they did not seek and which would be unprofitable.

With regard to the German problem, the Soviet diplomatic offensive seemed weak. At a time when West Germany, under a new coalition government, was evidencing a willingness to discuss the problem of reunification, German boundaries and European security in a spirit of compromise and accommodation, the Soviet leaders were accusing West Germany of militarism and revanchism in more and more strident terms. Such a course seemed likely either to discourage West German efforts at conciliation or to make West Germany more dependent than ever on the United States as its chief supporter in international politics. Neither course appeared useful in the context of a long-range Soviet strategy of separating West Europe from American influence. It could perhaps best be justified as a short-term policy intended to placate the East Germans, Poles and Czechs, all deeply fearful of West Germany and her still-standing territorial claims on them.

The German issue brings us to the Soviet Union's East European policy in this period. The recent Soviet effort to undermine NATO and wean West Europe away from the United

States has been accompanied by attempts to maintain the cohesion of the Soviet sphere of Europe in the face of growing restiveness on the part of some, although not all, of the East European governments. The main elements in this effort have revolved around the German issue, just mentioned, and the problem of relations with Communist China. In addition to introducing a new Soviet initiative toward West Europe, the 1966 Bucharest Conference was clearly designed, from the Soviet viewpoint, to establish or, better, to reaffirm, a common policy toward West Germany—namely, that no steps should be taken that might undermine the claims to legitimacy on the part of East Germany.

In the past, the West German government had short-sightedly abetted this Soviet objective by refusing (according to the so-called Hallstein Doctrine) to enter into diplomatic relations with any government (except the Soviet Union) recognizing East Germany. In the winter of 1966–1967, the new West German government of Kurt Georg Kiesinger indicated its willingness to relax this policy and to enter into diplomatic relations with the East European regimes. East Germany countered with a condemnation of this move, in which she was backed by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. An important element in this dispute is economic. During the past decade, West Germany has become the major Western trading partner of most of the East European states. Further growth in trade will probably occur, but it would be greatly aided by the normalization of political relations implied by formal diplomatic recognition. Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria desire such normalization. While the latter two have, so far, been willing to abide by the demands of the Soviet Union for non-recognition, in January, 1967, Rumania took the drastic step of establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany. What made this action particularly significant was the fact that only three days previously, the Soviet Union had directed a particularly harsh attack upon the West German government's new policy of reconciliation. The incident dramatically illustrates the extent to which

the Soviet Union has lost its ability to enforce policies on individual East European nations when these policies conflict with national interests. Now that the "line" on West Germany has been broken, it is to be anticipated that Bulgaria and Hungary will follow suit, over the wishes of both East Germany and the Soviet Union.

Since the recognition episode, Rumania has defied the Soviet Union and the other nations of East Europe on two other important occasions. The first was her refusal to attend a conference of 24 European Communist parties held in March, 1967, at Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia.² The Rumanians, together with the Yugoslavs, denounced the inflexible character of the German policy enunciated by the conference.

The second case of Rumanian independence occurred during the June, 1967, Middle East crisis. A hastily summoned Moscow conference of the Soviet and East European parties condemned joint Israeli-American imperialism and pledged support to the Arab nations involved in the conflict. Rumania, although present at the conference, refused to sign the statement, and subsequently called upon Israel and the Arab states to negotiate their differences. In this episode, Yugoslavia did support the other socialist states, probably because of its long-standing close relations with Egypt.

Rumania's opposition does not, of course, prove that Soviet influence in East Europe is negligible. The degree of Soviet influence will differ from one nation to the next in accordance with the strength and attitudes of the national Communist party and the nature of the issues being considered. Rumania is merely an extreme example—as Yugoslavia was before her—of the difficulties the Soviet Union faces in enforcing uniformity within her sphere. These difficulties are currently being intensified throughout East Europe by

the poor showing of Comecon (the socialist equivalent of the West European Common Market) and the growing attractiveness of trade with West Europe, and even of some form of association with the Common Market. Meanwhile despite the harshness of the Chinese criticisms of the Soviet Union, East European leaders eye askance Soviet efforts to create a common front against China. (A recent Chinese blast referred to the Soviet leaders as a "pack of traitors" and "shameless scabs.") There is good evidence that the Soviets had hoped to use the Karlovy Vary Conference to forge an anti-Chinese front. Instead, the conference limited itself to a repetition, with some elaborations, of the 1966 Bucharest Conference suggestions for the settlement of European issues. It is widely felt in the West that this unwillingness of the East European parties to be drawn into a common anti-Chinese front reflects their desire to retain a solid bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. If true, this strongly reinforces the image of an East Europe seeking freedom of maneuver within the Soviet sphere.

The line of analysis followed in this article has shown the Soviets engaged in a two-sided struggle over Europe. On the one hand, concerted efforts are being made, in part *through* the nations of East Europe, to encourage West European self-assertion and dissociation from American policies and influence. On the other hand, there are attempts, not entirely successful, to maintain the cohesiveness of the East European Soviet sphere. There is an element of contradiction in these two policies, a contradiction which might, in the long run, handicap the Soviet Union in its relations with Europe.

As the Soviets seek to encourage the auton-

(Continued on page 241)

² Three West European parties—the Dutch, the Swedish and the Icelandic—also refused to attend, as did the Albanian and Yugoslavian parties. The Swedish party sent only an observer. The British delegation publicly criticized certain Soviet positions during the conference. All of this attests to the lack of cohesion in the international Communist movement generally.

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"... there has been no radical change of direction in Soviet defense preparations or in the strategic philosophy underlying them since Khrushchev left the scene." On the other hand, this specialist points out that "there has been a tendency to recognize more explicitly than hitherto that Soviet forces must be prepared for a wide range of situations involving either nuclear or conventional operations."

Soviet Military Policy at the Fifty Year Mark

By THOMAS W. WOLFE
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THE PAST HALF CENTURY has seen the growth of the Soviet Union into one of the world's two strongest military powers, with an industrial-technical base commensurate to superpower status in the modern world.* The Soviet armed forces themselves have not only met the supreme test of a great war, but through 50 years of sometimes turbulent Soviet history they have remained the obedient instrument of the successive party leaderships that have controlled the destinies of the Soviet state. These are no mean accomplishments, and the present Soviet leaders may be pardoned if they tend to look back with pride and satisfaction at the military aspects of Soviet growth and development.

At the same time, however, the present collective leadership under Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin can scarcely avoid giving sober thought to tasks and problems in the military field that bear upon the future path the Soviet Union may follow in the years ahead. Indeed, as the Soviet Union has evolved into a more mature and

complex society, placing subtle new demands upon those who direct its policies at home and abroad, the problems of creating modern military power and of using it to political advantage have become more difficult and intricate.

In Stalin's day, following World War II, Soviet military policy had been oriented in a relatively straightforward way toward two primary tasks: the first and most urgent, to break the American nuclear monopoly; the second, to hold Europe hostage to preponderant Soviet conventional military power while the first was being accomplished. Comparatively little attention was given under Stalin to a number of more subtle problems, such as determining the political utility of military power in the nuclear age and developing a body of strategic thought responsive to the changing technological and political environment of the modern world. It was left largely to Nikita Khrushchev in the decade or so after Stalin's death to preside over the process of incorporating the new weapons of the nuclear-missile age into the armed forces, along with appropriate concepts for their use.

For various reasons, this proved to be a somewhat painful process. For one thing,

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

Khrushchev found himself wrestling with the paradox that even as technology invested military power with an ever-increasing destructiveness and coercive potential, constraints upon its use grew apace, tending to multiply the risks and narrow the opportunities for turning military power to political advantage. Although this was a universal paradox confronting not the Soviet leadership alone, it had particularly damaging effects upon the doctrines of a Marxist-Leninist leadership elite schooled to take a tough-minded view of force and violence as agents of revolutionary sociopolitical change. It led to revision of such Leninist tenets as the inevitability of war between the rival systems, helping to persuade Khrushchev that a new world war was too dangerous to serve as the "midwife" for another round of Communist advance, and that even lesser forms of revolutionary conflict might escalate into a large nuclear conflagration which could jeopardize the Soviet system itself.

In the immediate area of military policy, Khrushchev's role as revisionist and reformer likewise had a painful impact. The organizational and conceptual reforms which he imposed upon the Soviet military establishment were—at least in the eyes of conservative-minded elements among the marshals—too radical to be swallowed easily. Khrushchev's military philosophy, based on the primacy of strategic deterrent power, won out eventually, but not without generating a good deal of resistance.

This then, in briefest outline, was the background against which Khrushchev's successors took over the responsibility for Soviet military policy. During the three years since Khrushchev was removed from office in 1964, Soviet military policy under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has moved through an initial "stand-pat" period of reappraisal¹ into what may be described as the regime's own response to various major issues confronting it.

¹ For discussion of this initial period of policy reappraisal, see the author's "Military Policy: A Soviet Dilemma," *Current History*, October, 1965.

² The announced 1965 military budget was 12.8 billion rubles, about 500 million rubles less than Khrushchev's 1964 defense budget.

Before taking stock of specific developments in the field of Soviet defense posture and policy under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, one should make the general observation that there has been no radical change of direction in Soviet defense preparations or in the strategic philosophy underlying them since Khrushchev left the scene.

What has happened, rather, can be regarded as an effort to broaden Soviet military capacities in fields which suffered some neglect under Khrushchev's programs, while at the same time retaining the central feature of his military philosophy, the essence of which was to place primary emphasis on Soviet strategic nuclear-missile power. In this process, prompted perhaps by a belief of the present leadership that it must provide itself with a wider range of military options and divest itself of the political liability of having only a second-best strategic posture in future crisis situations, somewhat more attention has been given to strengthening the substance which stands behind the image of imposing Soviet military power cultivated by Khrushchev.

Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime may ultimately find that many of the military policy problems on its agenda will remain essentially intractable, nevertheless the steps it has taken thus far are having significant effects on the Soviet defense posture and on the military power relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, changes in the Soviet Union's strategic position have been accompanied by revival of internal discussion, and sometimes argument, over the doctrinal and policy implications of Soviet military development, as well as by airing of questions pertaining to relations between civil and military authority.

THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION ISSUE

Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime started out with the apparent intention of holding a ceiling on military expenditures, as indicated by its adoption of a 1965 military budget slightly smaller than Khrushchev's for the preceding year,² it rather soon became evident that the new leadership was to find

no easy way out of the ever-perplexing problem of economic-defense priorities. The details of early contention around the issue of resource allocation may be found in a previous article by the present writer;³ here, suffice to say that military spokesmen first surfaced the issue with a series of theoretical arguments in 1965 implying that one-sided emphasis on war deterrence, as practiced under Khrushchev, could lead to neglect of all-around strengthening of the armed forces and to questioning of "the need to spend large resources on them."⁴

At about the same time that military writers were suggesting that there were no ruble-saving shortcuts to Soviet security, divergent views showed up within the political leadership, with some leaders espousing resource priority for internal economic development while others stressed the need for further strengthening of Soviet defenses to meet the threat posed by a deteriorating international situation.⁵ During 1965 and 1966, the extended crisis growing out of the war in Southeast Asia tended to buttress the position of the latter in the internal policy debate over economic-defense priorities. That they were gaining ground was indicated by a five per cent increase in the military budget for 1966—to 13.4 billion rubles—and by Kosygin's observation at the 23d Party Congress in April, 1966, that "aggravation of the world

situation" had adversely affected Soviet plans for economic development, preventing the Soviet Union from making "a substantial reduction in military expenditures and correspondingly greater capital investment in peaceful sectors of the economy."⁶

By the beginning of 1967, it became still clearer that arguments for larger defense expenditures had prevailed, even at the cost of some setback of investment in other sectors of the economy. There was, for example, another increase in the published military budget for 1967—to 14.5 billion rubles, a boost of about eight per cent. These figures, it should be noted, are what the Soviet Union has chosen to announce publicly. Actual military expenditures, part of which are buried under other budgetary headings, are generally somewhat higher—at least one-third higher, according to Western estimates.⁷

As matters stand today, the supposition that military requirements are actually taking a bigger bite out of Soviet resources than the published figures indicate is strengthened by delay in ratifying the new five year plan for the 1966–1970 period. The guidelines for this plan were issued in early 1966 and discussed at the 23d Party Congress in April, 1966, where Kosygin said the plan should be ratified within four or five months by the Supreme Soviet. However, at this writing more than a year later, only the current year's plan has thus far been approved, suggesting that unresolved difficulties of resource allocation between military-space programs and civilian sectors of the economy are still being thrashed out.⁸ As we shall see, later, one of the defense questions which has complicated Soviet planning appears to center around deployment of an ABM (missile defense) system, an undertaking that will involve very substantial new expenditures at a time when other investment will also have to be stepped up to meet the goals of the five year plan.

It goes without saying that the urgency accorded Soviet military preparations depends in no small measure on what the Soviet leadership thinks about the likelihood of a major war in today's world, as well as on the question, whether war in the nuclear age has

³ See *Current History*, October, 1965, pp. 202–205. See also the author's *The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations*, The RAND Corporation, RM-4913-PR, June, 1966, pp. 62–72.

⁴ Colonel I. Sidel'nikov, "V. I. Lenin on the Class Approach to Defining the Character of War," *Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star)*, September 22, 1965.

⁵ For details, see *Current History*, October, 1965.

⁶ *Pravda*, April 6, 1966.

⁷ See, for example, J. G. Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet Military Establishment," in *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, December, 1962, pp. 35–46. See also article by Timothy Sosnovy, who argues that buried expenditures may be again as large as the published military budget, in "The Soviet Military Budget," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1964, pp. 487–494.

⁸ Among other problems holding up approval of the plan was apparently that of working out a pricing system for the economic reform program under which increasing numbers of Soviet enterprises are to be converted to a system using profitability as a criterion of economic performance.

become obsolete as an instrument of policy. On the first issue, there has been a marked tendency in Soviet media since early 1965 to sound the theme that the "aggressive character of imperialism" is increasing, making it the "most important duty" of the Soviet Communist party and other Marxist-Leninist parties "not to permit an underevaluation of the danger of war."⁹ The new leaders themselves have expressed concern that the danger of war has grown in light of United States "aggression" in Vietnam.¹⁰ The critical point, however, is what distinction to make between Soviet declaratory utterances on the likelihood of war—which serve various purposes of internal argument and external propaganda—and the private convictions of the leadership.

Any opinion ventured on this subject is bound to be speculative. The present writer would be inclined to believe that the incumb-

⁹ For typical examples see General P. Kurochkin, "Strengthening of Aggressiveness—A Characteristic Trait of Contemporary Imperialism," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 9, 1965; Fedor Burlatski, "Lessons of the Struggle for Unity," *Pravda*, June 24, 1965; Marshal R. Malinovski, "October and the Building of the Armed Forces," *Kommunist*, No. 1, January, 1967, p. 32.

¹⁰ See speeches by Brezhnev, *Pravda*, September 11, 1965, and *Izvestia*, October 24, 1965; by Kosygin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 1, 1965; by Suslov, *Pravda*, October 31, 1965; Kosygin interview with James Reston, *The New York Times*, December 8, 1965; Garbuzov in *Pravda*, December 8, 1965; Brezhnev speech at the 23d Party Congress, *Pravda*, March 30, 1966.

¹¹ For an elaborate Soviet analysis of how the combination of Soviet military power and "peace forces" abroad act to prevent a world war, see Major General N. Ia. Sushko and Colonel S. A. Tiushkevich, eds., *Marksizm-Leninizm o voine i armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army)* (4th edition; Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), pp. 83-91.

¹² For discussion of the debate on war as an instrument of policy during the Khrushchev period, see the present author's *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 70-78.

¹³ "On the Essence of World Missile-Nuclear War," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces)*, No. 17, September, 1965, pp. 50-56. Rybkin, although not widely known outside the U.S.S.R., is author of an earlier book in which he also argued that modern war, no matter how destructive, is bound to have politically significant consequences. See *Voina i politika (War and Politics)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), pp. 25-26.

¹⁴ "The Question of the Essence of War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 21, 1966.

ent Soviet leadership still considers a major war between the rival systems to be unlikely—if not thanks to benign United States intentions, then because of a combination of Soviet deterrent military power and the political forces generally described as the "world peace movement."¹¹ A qualification should probably be added, however, with regard to Soviet concern that a local war, such as the one in Vietnam, might get out of control, or that the policy of a resurgent Germany might one day draw the United States and the Soviet Union into war.

With regard to the second question posed above, doctrinal ferment has again arisen in the Soviet Union around the issue of war as a policy instrument. During Khrushchev's tenure there had been a definite tendency to admit that nuclear war was likely to be militarily unmanageable and that Lenin's dictum on war as a continuation of politics was obsolete.¹² Since the fall of 1965, however, beginning with an article by Lieutenant Colonel E. Rybkin in the semimonthly journal, *Communist of the Armed Forces*,¹³ this view has frequently been challenged. The Rybkin article attacked by name such prominent Soviet writers as General Nicolai Talenski for having spread the "fatalistic" doctrine that it is no longer possible "to find acceptable forms of nuclear war." Rybkin agreed that such a war would create great havoc but said Russians should not accept the doctrine that victory in nuclear war is impossible.

These views have been echoed in part by other military writers, but there has also been pointed criticism of certain aspects of Rybkin's argument. For example, in July, 1966, Colonel I. Grudin joined the attack on the "no-victory" notion promulgated in the Khrushchev era by people like Talenski, but took Rybkin to task for adopting ideas which smacked too much of "bourgeois" theorizing about modern war.¹⁴ In particular, he argued that Rybkin had strayed from Marxist-Leninist analysis by pragmatically stressing the material balance of forces, or what in the Western idiom might be called "hardware factors," while failing to give sufficient weight

to the ideological advantages of the Soviet system.

Still another military theorist on this subject was Lieutenant Colonel V. Bondarenko, writing in September, 1966, who argued that the key to victory lay in a massive and imaginative research and development effort to assure military-technological superiority.¹⁵ Asserting that a properly managed research program should avoid the dangerous mistake of concentrating merely on improvement of existing weapons, he advanced the thesis that new breakthroughs in weaponry "can abruptly change the relationship of forces in a short period of time." A further contribution to the discussion stimulated by these various military theorists appeared early in 1967 in an unsigned editorial in *Red Star*.¹⁶ Noting that writers like Rybkin had taken a "creative, independent approach" to problems of modern war, the article stated at the same time that Rybkin and Grudinin had unfortunately skirted some of the changes to be taken into account under nuclear-age conditions. Although the article itself reiterated doctrinaire claims of Communist victory if

war should come, its main emphasis lay upon the need for "anti-imperialist forces" to oppose nuclear war "as a means for resolving international disputes."

The revival in the Soviet Union of the theoretical argument about modern war as a policy instrument does not necessarily mean that a hardline element has begun to urge a current policy shift involving a much higher risk of war than hitherto. The central point stressed by the various military theorists cited above seems to be not that the present "correlation of forces" would offer a good prospect of Soviet victory if war should occur, but that future changes in the power relationship between the Soviet Union and its adversaries might do so. This suggests, in turn, that Soviet military theorists may feel that the programs being carried out by Khrushchev's successors have improved the prospects of reversing the strategic power balance between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Although Khrushchev's successors evidently came into office dissatisfied with the strategic balance as it stood, it was by no means clear at the time what they proposed to do about it. Their initial approach did indicate a determination to improve the technological base on which any effort to alter the balance in Soviet favor would ultimately depend. Appropriations for scientific research were stepped up¹⁷ and, as made evident among other things by public display of new families of weapons,¹⁸ the Soviet military research and development program was pushed more vigorously. It was only after the new leaders had been in office for a year or two, however, that it gradually became apparent that they had committed themselves to a substantial buildup of Soviet strategic delivery forces.

As indicated by informed accounts which began to appear in the United States press in the summer and fall of 1966, an accelerated program of ICBM deployment was under way in the Soviet Union.¹⁹ By the beginning of 1967, according to some of these accounts, the number of operational ICBM's had reached around 400 to 450, and deployment was continuing at a rate of more than 100 a year.²⁰ These figures compared with a total

¹⁵ "Military-Technical Superiority — The Most Important Factor in Reliable Defense of the Country," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 17, September, 1966, pp. 7-14.

¹⁶ "On the Essence of War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 24, 1967. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Russians Debate Nuclear 'Victory,'" *The Washington Star*, February 21, 1967.

¹⁷ Published Soviet allocations for scientific research have risen as follows: 1963—4.7 billion rubles; 1964—5.2; 1965—5.4; 1966—6.5; 1967—7.2. *Pravda*, December 11, 1962; December 17, 1963; December 8, 1965; *Izvestia*, December 16, 1966. A substantial amount of spending for military purposes is evidently included in these figures.

¹⁸ For accounts of Red Square displays of new equipment, see: *Pravda*, November 8, 1965; *Krasnaia zvezda*, November 10, 1965; *The New York Times*, November 8, 1964, May 9, 1965, November 8, 1965.

¹⁹ Among such accounts, see "Russian Missiles Estimated at 400," *The New York Times*, June 9, 1966; Hanson W. Baldwin, "U.S. Lead in ICBM's Is Said To Be Reduced by Buildup in Soviet Union," *ibid.*, July 14, 1966; William Beecher, "Soviet Increases Buildup of Missiles and Deploys a Defensive System," *ibid.*, November 13, 1966; Beecher, "A New Round on Missiles," *ibid.*, December 18, 1966. See also *The Military Balance, 1966-1967* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, September, 1966), p. 2.

²⁰ Richard J. Whalen, "The Shifting Equation of Nuclear Defense," *Fortune*, June 1, 1967, p. 87.

deployment of less than 200 ICBM launchers during the entire Khrushchev period. Not less significant than the rapid growth of numbers was a shift to new types of missiles in dispersed and hardened sites, in contrast with the ICBM force of the Khrushchev period, much of which consisted of early-generation missiles of "soft-site" configuration.

Meanwhile, as emphasized in the late Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovski's report at the 23d Party Congress in April, 1966, "special importance" has been attached to developing mobile land-based missiles for the strategic missile forces,²¹ a step which would further diversify the Soviet Union's strategic delivery potential. The same report pointed out that the Soviet Union continues to count upon the additional contribution to its strategic delivery capabilities provided by long-range bomb-

ers equipped with air-to-surface missiles for "standoff" attacks against enemy targets and by missile-launching submarines.²²

The ultimate size and character of the Soviet strategic forces remain uncertain. It does seem clear, however, that the familiar situation of the past two decades, in which the United States enjoyed marked strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, is changing and that a new correlation of forces could emerge in the next few years. The precise nature of a new strategic balance is not predictable, but if the programs undertaken by the present Soviet regime continue, a situation of "parity" or perhaps even some margin of "superiority" might be attained by the Soviet Union, depending in part upon what response the United States chooses to make.

A great deal of controversy attends the question of what constitutes "parity" or "superiority"; indeed, the point at which it becomes militarily meaningless to exceed a major nuclear adversary in numbers of weapons, megatonnage or other attributes of strategic forces is something on which views differ widely not only in the United States, but apparently in the Soviet Union as well.²³ Whatever the military merits of the argument may be, however, the political implications of the strategic force equation are another matter. And it is in this regard that any substantial change in the previous strategic balance will be likely to pose far-reaching questions.

For example, in an environment of acknowledged strategic parity or superiority, will the Soviet leaders feel more secure and be inclined to play a more responsible and prudent *status quo* role in international politics? Or will they be prompted to seek fresh political gains from a more favorable correlation of forces, leading to pursuit of more aggressive policies which could introduce new elements of turbulence into international relations? Only the future holds the answer.

Another step taken by the new regime to bolster the Soviet strategic posture, and one which was held in abeyance under Khrushchev, relates to antiballistic missile defenses. As made known late in 1966 by the United States government,²⁴ after some months of

²¹ *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 2, 1966.

²² As is the Soviet custom, Malinovski gave no figures for the size of the Soviet Union's long-range bomber and missile-launching submarine forces. According to recent Western estimates, the Soviet Union possesses about 200 heavy bombers (M-4 "Bisons" and TU-95 "Bears," some of which are used as tankers) and about 35 submarines capable of firing an average of three ballistic missiles each. In addition, about 40 submarines are equipped to fire cruise-type winged missiles, which could be used against land targets but which probably have a primary mission against the adversary's naval forces. See *The Military Balance, 1966-1967*, pp. 3, 5.

²³ For a recent U.S. example of such controversy, see the account in *The New York Times*, July 12, 1967, of a study by The American Security Council sponsored by the House Armed Services Committee, together with an answering statement by the Department of Defense. In the Soviet case, long-standing doctrinal commitment to the goal of both quantitative and qualitative superiority has sometimes been at odds with the view that among major nuclear powers "Superiority has become a concept which has no bearing on war." See G. Gerasimov, "Pentagonia, 1966," *International Affairs*, No. 5, May, 1966, p. 28.

²⁴ The first official U.S. cognizance of "considerable evidence" that the Soviet Union was deploying an antiballistic missile defense system was given by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in an interview on November 10, 1966 (*The New York Times*, November 11, 1966). Among earlier analyses of Soviet ABM activity, see John R. Thomas, "The Role of Missile Defense in Soviet Strategy," *Military Review*, May, 1964. According to one estimate attributed to American officials in early 1967, the Soviet Union had spent up to that time from \$4 to \$5 billion on development of its ABM system, compared with something over \$2 billion spent by the United States on development of the Nike-X missile defense system. See Hedrick Smith in *The New York Times*, January 29, 1967.

speculation in the press that ABM defenses were being installed around such cities as Moscow and Leningrad, the Soviet Union has embarked upon deployment of an ABM system—the extent and effectiveness of which is still a matter of considerable debate in the West. According to some accounts, it remains unclear at the moment whether the system is confined to Moscow alone, or whether another system covering a larger geographical area is also a part of the current ABM deployment.²⁵ Speculation about the effectiveness of ABM measures taken thus far

²⁵ See, for example, Hanson W. Baldwin, "A New Round Begins in the Battle of Sword vs. Shield," *The New York Times*, November 27, 1966; Henry Gemmill, "The Missile Race," *Wall Street Journal*, December 14, 1966. For a discussion of the question whether the second system represents a defense against missiles or aircraft, see Hanson W. Baldwin, "Soviet Anti-missile System Spurs New U.S. Weapons," *The New York Times*, February 5, 1967; and articles in *The Washington Post*, February 22, 23, 1967.

²⁶ For several years, Soviet military leaders have publicly advanced claims for Soviet ABM progress, varying from outright assertions that the Soviet Union has solved the ABM problem to more guarded statements like that of Marshal Malinowski in April, 1966, that Soviet defenses could cope with some but not all enemy missiles.

²⁷ Among such signs was publication of a *Pravda* article on February 15, 1967, in which Kosygin was made out to be more receptive to the idea of an ABM moratorium than his London remarks warranted. Two days later Western news agencies reported that the article, written by F. Burlatski, had been repudiated by Soviet sources who claimed that the regime's position on ABM negotiations was negative, as would be made clear in a new article. The article did not appear, suggesting an internal policy hassle. In March, a strong statement of the military case for going ahead with the ABM program appeared in a *Red Star* article stressing the importance of strategic defense measures. Both the article and its timing suggested an attempt to influence the policy debate over ABM. See Lieutenant General I. Zavyalov, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 31, 1967.

²⁸ The U.S. margin over the Soviet Union in intercontinental strategic missiles, according to published figures reflecting the situation as of October, 1966, was around 1,450 land- and sea-based missiles for the United States against about 470 for the Soviet Union, a ratio of about 3 to 1. See George C. Wilson's article in *The Washington Post*, April 9, 1967.

²⁹ In addition to steps discussed in the text, two other matters with potential implications for the Soviet strategic posture are worth mention. One was Soviet interest in development of an orbital delivery system, as evidenced both by statements of military officials and parade display of a large missile (SCRAG), claimed to have orbital capability. The other was renewed public emphasis on civil defense preparations, accompanied in January, 1967, by reorganization of the civil defense system.

by the Soviet Union has been further heightened by public expression of differing opinion on the subject among Soviet military officials.²⁶

Why the present Soviet regime decided to deploy an ABM system and to claim a significant Soviet advantage in this field is not altogether clear. The Soviet leaders were undoubtedly aware that "first deployment" of ABM's has been widely regarded in the West as a step which could "destabilize" the strategic environment and set off a new round of the arms race. In light of the earlier example of the "missile gap" which in the late 1950's and early 1960's stimulated American missile programs and had the net result of placing the Soviet Union in a relatively unfavorable position with respect to strategic forces, one might have supposed that the Soviet leaders would think twice about stirring up an "ABM gap" psychology. However, Soviet predilection for building strategic defenses, combined with possible overcoming of earlier technical obstacles in ABM development, seemingly prevailed over the economic costs and the risks of stimulating the strategic arms race.

Whether this decision will hold up in the face of American efforts to persuade the Soviet government to reconsider its ABM policy remains to be seen. At this writing, nothing concrete has emerged from the exploratory United States-Soviet talks initiated in late February, 1967, apart from signs that the United States initiative may have aroused fresh internal policy debate within the Soviet government.²⁷ However, by agreeing to explore the matter, and by suggesting that any future negotiations should also take up the issue of strategic delivery forces in which the United States still enjoys a putative numerical advantage,²⁸ the Soviet leaders at least seem to be giving second thought to the possibility of improving the Soviet Union's relative position via the arms control route, rather than banking solely on a further unilateral buildup of Soviet offensive and defensive strategic forces.

Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, steps taken to bolster the Soviet strategic posture²⁹

have been accompanied by fresh attention to the possibility of nonnuclear warfare in various potential theaters of conflict, including Europe. Reflecting in part the pressure from some professional military leaders to achieve better balanced forces than those inherited from the Khrushchev period, and in part perhaps a reaction to such nonnuclear conflicts as those in Vietnam and the Middle East, there has been a tendency to recognize more explicitly than hitherto that Soviet forces must be prepared for a wide range of situations involving either nuclear or conventional operations.

LIMITED WARFARE

With increasing frequency over the past year or two, Soviet military spokesmen have departed from the once standard litany of immediate strategic nuclear escalation, suggesting that hostilities involving possessors of strategic nuclear arsenals might not automatically call them into use. As some military men put it, Soviet military doctrine does not "exclude" the possibility of nonnuclear warfare or of warfare limited to tactical nuclear weapons "within the framework of so-called 'local' wars," which could "take place even in Europe."³⁰ Another writer—without mentioning Europe—stated that Soviet military doctrine today calls for the armed forces to "be prepared to conduct world war as well as limited war, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons."³¹ Among the more recent expressions of the view that nuclear weapons should not be treated as "absolutes," especially in theater force operations, was one

stated by Marshal I. I. Yakubovskii, newly-appointed commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, who asserted in July, 1967, that the efforts of the party and the government had improved "the capability of the ground forces to conduct military operations successfully with or without the use of nuclear weapons."³²

Although there has clearly been recognition that the theater forces should be better prepared for situations in which it might not be expedient to bring Soviet strategic nuclear power to bear, this does not mean that reliance upon Soviet nuclear arms, in either a military or political sense, has been abandoned by the new regime, as some Western observers have tended to conclude from such articles as that by Yakubovskii.

Indeed, some Soviet professional opinion has insisted that any war in a place like Europe "would immediately assume the broadest dimensions,"³³ while such a well-known military authority as Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii has upheld the view that the responsibility of Soviet strategy is to plan properly for the use "above all of missile-nuclear weapons as the main means of warfare."³⁴ In an article in early 1967, not long before his death, Marshal Malinovskii, the Soviet defense minister, stated categorically that in Soviet defense planning "First priority is being given to the strategic missile forces and atomic missile-launching submarines—forces which are the principal means of deterring the aggressor and decisively defeating him in war."³⁵

On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that, in surveying such policy commitments as those which it has taken on to back the Arab nations in the Middle East imbroglio or to support elsewhere what are known in the Communist lexicon as "national-liberation struggles," the present Soviet regime can scarcely afford to ignore the military implications of such commitments. One of these implications would seem to be that the Soviet Union must give further attention to the maritime-air-logistic elements of power needed to project its military influence into local conflict situations without having to invoke the threat of immediate nuclear holocaust, a requirement congenial to the argu-

³⁰ See Colonel General S. Shtemenko, *Nedelia*, No. 6, January 31–February 6, 1965, and Major General N. Lomov, "The Influence of Soviet Military Doctrine on the Development of the Military Art," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 21, November, 1965, pp. 16, 18.

³¹ Colonel N. Kozlov, "The USSR Armed Forces in the Period of Building Communism," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 4, February, 1967, p. 80.

³² "Ground Forces," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 21, 1967.

³³ Major General V. Zemskov, "The Escalation of Madness," *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 3, 1965.

³⁴ Marshal V. Sokolovskii and General M. Cherdnichenko, "On Contemporary Military Strategy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 7, April, 1966.

³⁵ *Kommunist*, No. 1, January, 1967, p. 34.

ments of those who urge better-rounded forces.

As a matter of fact, the present regime has moved in this direction, building on measures initiated in the Khrushchev era to improve Soviet amphibious and airlift capabilities, to train the reactivated marine forces (naval infantry) in landing operations, and to secure base arrangements growing out of Soviet military aid programs abroad. The dispatch of Soviet naval units, including special landing vessels, to the Mediterranean in connection with the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis was a clear example of this trend. How far the Soviet leadership may be prepared to go, however, either in actually committing its own forces in local situations or in investing the resources necessary to make such intervention effective, remains among the critical questions on its agenda.

THE VIETNAM CRISIS

The unresolved war in Vietnam has posed for the Soviet leadership a somewhat analogous policy problem, further complicated by the strained state of Sino-Soviet relations. Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has gradually increased its support of Hanoi's military effort during the past couple of years, especially by furnishing SA-2 missiles and other air defense matériel, it has not sanctioned the formal commitment of Soviet military forces to the war in Southeast Asia.³⁶ Presumably, in the interest of avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States, the Soviet leaders would prefer to keep their military involvement limited to furnishing equipment, technical advice and training to Hanoi's soldiery, although they have occa-

sionally spoken of permitting "volunteers" to participate, which would still be something less than formal intervention. Beyond experimenting with volunteers, the Soviet leadership's room for maneuver would seem to be constricted not only by the risk of major escalation, but by the fact that geography makes direct Soviet intervention difficult. Charges of Chinese refusal to cooperate in the overland shipment of Soviet aid to North Vietnam have pointed up this difficulty.

With regard to China, the Soviet Union evidently has had to consider military problems potentially a good deal more serious than interference with shipments to Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, for example, the Soviet leadership reportedly felt obliged to castigate Peking for telling the Chinese people that "it is necessary to prepare themselves for a military struggle with the U.S.S.R."³⁷ Since that time, Sino-Soviet relations have grown still more inflamed in the climate of Mao's Cultural Revolution, amid rumors of frontier clashes and mutual military precautions in the border territories of the two countries.³⁸ Although an outright military collision between the two Communist powers is still perhaps only a remote possibility, the new Soviet regime doubtless has been obliged to reassess its military preparations with such a contingency in mind. In this connection, according to Peking's allegations, there has evidently been some internal redeployment of Soviet forces in the Asian regions bordering China.³⁹

Neither the Vietnamese conflict nor friction with China, however, seems to have

(Continued on page 244)

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³⁶ For a discussion of the Soviet Union's gradually increasing military aid to Hanoi see the author's *The Soviet Military Scene*, pp. 109-124.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 137, 174.

³⁸ See Victor Zorza, "Soviet Press Clamors Over Chinese Military Threat," *The Washington Post*, November 10, 1966; "Chinese Report Soviet Border Clash," *ibid.*, February 14, 1967; Charles Mohr, "Observers Speculate That Tensions Along the Soviet-Chinese Border May Be Rising," *The New York Times*, February 21, 1967.

³⁹ See remarks on this question to a group of Scandinavian journalists by Chinese Deputy Premier Chen Yi, *The New York Times*, July 21, 1966.

Although "expanding Soviet trade ties" with the West offer more hope for a continuing East-West détente, Soviet policy in the developing countries continues to emphasize "implements of war [rather] than industrial equipment for economic development." Our author maintains that this policy "poses both an opportunity and a threat to the interests of world peace and security."

Soviet Aid and Trade

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REFLECTING the autarkic drive of Stalin's economic policy, a pre-World War II Soviet study on world trade expressed approval of the fact that the U.S.S.R., "second in world industrial production, ranked nineteenth in world trade."¹ On the eve of the jubilee year of the U.S.S.R., however, its minister of foreign trade boasted: "Today, the U.S.S.R. is one of the leading countries in foreign trade, holding fifth place."²

Implicit in the contrasting tone of such statements is the "coming of age" of Soviet foreign economic policy, and the growing role the U.S.S.R. has undertaken to play in world economic affairs—a role that poses both an opportunity and a threat to the interests of world peace and security. Expanding Soviet trade ties with Western nations offer new channels for East-West contact and co-operation. But Soviet policy in developing countries, which has thus far placed at the disposal of new states far more implements of war than industrial equipment for economic development, is a grave reminder that, for Moscow, foreign trade continues to be as much a political as an economic phenomenon.

¹ S. Bakulin and D. Mishustin, *Statistika Vneshney Torgovli* (Moscow, 1940), p. 299.

² N. Patolichev, "Soviet Foreign Trade in the New Five Year Plan," *Vneshnia Torgovlia* (in English), Moscow, 1967, p. 4.

³ *Prauda*, May 10, 1958.

Although only one-fifth of the almost \$17 billion worth of Soviet foreign trade in 1966 was conducted with the developed nations of the West (the bulk of Soviet international trade is concentrated in exchanges with other socialist countries), trade with this area has grown at impressive rates over the past decade—an average of more than 12 per cent per year. (See Table 1.) The U.S.S.R. has looked upon the industrialized countries of the West as a pool of goods to compensate for the failures and miscalculations of its planning mechanism, and to achieve planned goals more rapidly than its own resources and efforts would permit. Perhaps of greater importance, purchases of advanced industrial equipment and technical data from the West stimulate industrial technology and release scarce research and development talent and facilities for use elsewhere in the economy. In 1958, Premier Nikita Khrushchev clearly expressed Soviet interest in seeking high quality equipment of the latest design when, in reference to the effort to build up the Soviet chemical industry through imports of plant and equipment, he declared that the purchase of such equipment from capitalist countries would provide the U.S.S.R. with "the opportunity of quicker fulfillment of its program . . . without wasting time on the creation of plans and mastering of the production of new types of equipment."³ In the spring

of 1966, Premier Aleksei Kosygin confirmed this policy by asserting that the U.S.S.R. "could profit by purchasing licenses rather than developing the problem concerned ourselves. Purchase of patent rights abroad will enable us to save hundreds of millions of rubles on scientific research during the coming five years."⁴

Soviet imports of plant and equipment from the developed countries, largely high-speed, highly productive equipment in many categories—cement plants, chemical equipment, textile machinery and mining equipment, to name only a few—have increased from \$180 million in 1955 to a record \$620 million in 1964,⁵ and ranged during these years between 31 and 47 per cent of total annual imports from the area. On the export side, fuels (primarily petroleum), wood and wood products and base metals and manufactures have been the major Soviet foreign exchange earners, constituting about two-thirds of total Soviet exports.

THE BURDEN OF BALANCING PAYMENTS

As Soviet purchases in the West have accelerated, however, the problem of finding sufficient quantities of marketable exports has become increasingly difficult. The traditional commodity composition of Soviet exports thus far has shown little indication of the diversification which is a prerequisite for any substantial expansion of the volume of Soviet exports to the West. Soviet sales of machinery and equipment, the principal foreign exchange earner of most industrialized countries,

have been negligible to Western markets owing largely to Soviet failure to meet competitive standards of quality, servicing and sales promotion. Soviet protestations to the contrary, this relatively narrow range of Soviet export offerings, far more than existing restrictions on Communist access to the markets of the West, has hampered the development of trade with the industrialized nations, and particularly with the smaller countries of Western Europe, with which trade is already at relatively high levels.

Despite a favorable balance of trade with most West European trade partners, the U.S.S.R. has experienced serious balance of payments difficulties with hard-currency areas as a whole. Rapid increases in imports of capital equipment, supplemented by unplanned imports of wheat as a result of poor harvests in 1963 and 1965, resulted in a Soviet balance-of-trade deficit with the industrial Western countries of a record \$450 million in 1964. Such expenditures, coupled with sizable outlays of foreign exchange for needed commodities from developing countries, such as natural rubber from Malaysia, have created severe payments problems for the U.S.S.R. which have been only slightly ameliorated in 1965 and 1966.

Such deficits have been financed largely by Western medium- and long-term credits and by substantial exports of Soviet gold. According to reports of the Bank for International Settlements, the U.S.S.R. was obliged to sell between \$450 million and \$550 million worth of gold in each of the years 1963–1965, compared with an annual average of less than \$250 million in 1956–1962. Although such sustained exports of gold suggest a marked departure from the almost mercantilist preeminence which Stalin attached to the Soviet gold reserve, nonetheless, Soviet leaders must continue to value highly a commodity which, unlike most of the Soviet Union's other exports, can always find a market in the West and at a predictable price in any convertible currency. Moreover, the outflow of more than \$3 billion worth of gold to the West since 1955, and the deterioration of the Soviet gold reserve (the United States Bu-

⁴ *XXIII S'ezd KPSS* (Moscow, 1966), Part II, p. 62.

⁵ In response to balance of payments pressures exerted by the unforeseen need to import more than \$1 billion worth of wheat from Western countries during 1963–1965, the U.S.S.R. reduced imports of capital equipment in 1965 to \$500 million, the first such decline since 1958. That this retrenchment is only temporary is indicated by the large number of new orders placed in the West during the past 18 months, including what may be the largest single transaction between a Communist government and a capitalist firm, and probably the largest automotive deal in history. In May, 1966, the U.S.S.R. and the Fiat Company of Italy concluded an agreement under which the U.S.S.R. will acquire plant facilities with an eventual capacity of 600,000 cars. The U.S.S.R. has received a credit of approximately \$320 million to help cover the cost of the imported machinery.

TABLE I: SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
(in millions of U.S. dollars, f.o.b.)

	1955		1960		1966	
	Value	Per cent	Value	Per cent	Value	Per cent
<i>Total</i>	6,487	100.0	11,191	100.0	16,751	100.0
<i>Socialist Countries</i>	5,144	79.3	8,190	73.2	11,137	66.5
CEMA ¹	3,630	56.0	6,076	54.3	9,374	56.0
Communist China	1,392	21.4	1,665	14.9	319	1.9
Other ²	122	1.9	448	4.0	1,444	8.6
<i>Non-Socialist Countries</i>	1,344	20.7	3,005	26.8	5,614	33.5
Developed	974	15.0	2,042	18.2	3,449	20.6
Developing ³	371	5.7	963	8.6	2,166	12.9

¹ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, comprising Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Albania, Mongolia.

² Yugoslavia, North Korea, North Vietnam; Cuba (1960 and 1966).

³ Including a residual undistributed by country.

Note: Totals may not agree because of rounding.

Source: Official Soviet Trade Statistics.

reau of Mines estimates that annual sales have exceeded annual gold production in every year during the decade 1956–1965), coupled with the increasing burden of debt service to Western creditors, hold little promise that such measures offer any long-term solution to Soviet balance-of-payments problems.

Soviet leaders are not unaware, or unconcerned, about their limited export capabilities. In his address to the 23d Party Congress, Kosygin specifically called for a “reappraisal” of the role of foreign trade. He exhorted trade and industry officials to increase exports and to make them more effective. “It is essential,” he said, “to give priority to the export of plant and equipment and other manufactured goods, and to increase exports of such raw materials, semifinished goods and materials which generate for us good receipts of foreign currency.” The Soviet premier deemed it “doubly insufferable” that “first class equipment—the fruit of the creative thought and skill of our wonderful engineers and workers—does not reach foreign markets just because due attention is not paid to its proper finishing and technical documentation, and due to a lack of servicing and the absence of advertising.”⁶ The pace of future trade expansion with the developed Western countries, however, will hinge largely on the success of such efforts to build up export industries with prospects of hard currency sales.

TRADE WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Soviet trade with developing countries has been the most dynamic sector of Soviet international trade; indeed, Soviet trade with this area has been the most dynamic sector of all world trade flows during the past decade. In 1955, Soviet trade with developing countries was about \$370 million, and amounted to less than 6 per cent of total Soviet trade. By 1966, Soviet trade with the third world had increased almost six-fold, totaling more than \$2 billion, almost 40 per cent of its foreign trade with non-Communist countries. Although still relatively small in the aggregate either as a percentage of total Soviet foreign trade (13 per cent) or of the trade of developing countries (about 2 per cent), this trade has been of growing significance for several less developed countries. In 1965, for example, trade with the U.S.S.R. accounted for almost 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s total trade, about one-quarter of the trade of the U.A.R., and more than 20 per cent of the trade of Mali.

Much of the impetus for the rapidly growing Soviet trade ties with developing countries has been provided by the willingness of the U.S.S.R. to finance a sizeable share of its exports with long-term credits. Since 1960, aid disbursements, largely in the form of machinery and equipment and complete plants, have accounted for more than 40 per cent of all Soviet exports to the area. As a conse-

⁶ *XXIII S’ezd KPSS, op. cit.*, p. 61.

quence, the machinery and equipment category of Soviet exports has shown the most vigorous growth, increasing from \$5 million in 1955 (5 per cent of Soviet exports) to \$472 million in 1965 (more than half of Soviet exports).⁷ Petroleum and petroleum products accounted for roughly 15 per cent of Soviet exports, ferrous metals and wood and wood products, for 10 per cent, and foodstuffs for about 7 per cent. Soviet imports from developing countries in 1965 consisted largely of agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs; cotton and natural rubber accounted for 35 per cent, and foodstuffs such as coffee, tea, and cocoa for another 35 per cent.

Estimates by Soviet economists⁸ indicate that Soviet trade turnover with developing countries could reach \$3.7 billion by 1970—an ambitious but feasible goal. Implementation of the large backlog of unexpended credits should help sustain Soviet exports at relatively high levels. On the import side, commodity repayments on past Soviet credits should gradually rise, and prospects seem favorable for continuing Soviet imports of rubber and (because of growing East European requirements and increasing Soviet production costs) for some imports of crude oil.

Soviet efforts to raise overall consumption standards in the U.S.S.R. should provide opportunities for increased exports from devel-

oping countries of textile fibers, such as cotton, and tropical beverages, fruits and vegetables. Although the Soviets have made much of their willingness and ability to absorb not only the traditional exports of developing countries but also the output of their emerging industry, to date the U.S.S.R. has offered these countries only a small market for their manufactured goods—some 13 per cent of Soviet imports from the area in 1965. There is, however, some recent evidence to suggest a moderate increase in this share over the next few years.⁹

ECONOMIC AID

Since 1954, the Soviet Union has extended about \$6 billion in economic assistance to developing countries (excluding Cuba). In recent years, however, the pace of actual aid disbursements appears to have lagged considerably behind the growth in new aid extensions; and cumulative expenditures under Soviet aid credits to date have amounted to little more than one-third of its total aid commitments. Thus the volume of Soviet aid has not been very impressive when compared to that of Western countries. Indeed, the aid flow from all Communist nations to developing countries has been averaging roughly \$300 million (net repayments) annually,¹⁰ or only about 5 per cent of the net flow of official Western assistance to the area.

Moscow, however, has sought to enhance the political impact of its aid-giving both by maintaining some aid presence, however small, in a large number of countries, and by providing large-scale assistance to selected clients. Although the U.S.S.R. has made economic aid commitments to some 35 developing countries, India and Afghanistan account for more than three-quarters of total Soviet aid to Asia; the U.A.R. for almost half of Soviet aid to the Middle East; Algeria more than one-quarter of Soviet aid to countries in Africa; and Argentina, Brazil and in 1967, Chile, have received all the Soviet aid directed to Latin America (again with the exception of Cuba). (See Table 2.)

Although the terms of Soviet aid—generally 2.5 per cent over 12 years—have not been

⁷ Machinery and equipment comprise a major share of Soviet exports to the following countries: Pakistan, 75 per cent; India, 67 per cent; the U.A.R., 66 per cent; Mali, 57 per cent; Guinea, 48 per cent; Iraq, 46 per cent. All of these countries are major recipients of Soviet economic assistance.

⁸ *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March–16 June 1964* (New York: United Nations, 1964), p. 94.

⁹ During the past year, agreements have been concluded with Brazil and Chile which provide for Soviet delivery of machinery and equipment on credit and Soviet acceptance of 25 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, of the repayments in manufactured and semi-processed goods. Trade agreements with India and the U.A.R. for the period 1966–1970 provide for an increase in the share of manufactures in Soviet imports from these countries, and similar provisions have been included in shorter-term trade agreements with Ceylon, Pakistan and Syria.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations*, Research Memorandum, RSB-80 (July 21, 1967), p. 6.

**TABLE II: SOVIET EXTENSIONS OF ECONOMIC AID TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1965, 1966 AND 1954-1966**
(In millions of U.S. dollars)

	1965	1966	1954-1966
<i>Total</i>	683	974	5,939
<i>Africa</i>	28	75	847
Algeria		1	232
Cameroon			8
Congo (B)			9
Ethiopia			102
Ghana			89
Guinea		3	73
Kenya			44
Mali			55
Morocco		42	42
Senegal			7
Sierra Leone	28		28
Somalia		9	66
Sudan			22
Tanzania		20	20
Tunisia			34
Uganda			16
<i>Asia</i>	66	660	2,797
Afghanistan	11	1	565
Burma			14
Cambodia		4	25
Ceylon			30
India	2	571	1,593
Indonesia	3		372
Nepal			20
Pakistan	50	84	178
<i>Latin America</i>	15	100	145
Argentina	15		45
Brazil		100	100
<i>Middle East</i>	574	139	2,150
Greece	84		84
Iran	290		330
Iraq		6	190
Syria		133	233
Turkey	200		210
UAR			1,011
Yemen			92

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Economic Aid and Trade*, Research Memoranda, RSB-50 (June 17, 1966), and RSB-80 (July 21, 1967).

overly generous when compared with long-term loans from Western countries and such

¹¹ According to United Nations data, in 1965 more than half of all Western aid to developing countries was committed as grants. (Only some 5 per cent of Soviet assistance has been extended in the form of grant aid.) Although Western interest rates were higher, generally 3-6 per cent, two-thirds of the value of Western loans carried maturities of between 15 and 40 years.

institutions as the World Bank,¹¹ the willingness of the U.S.S.R. to accept as repayment for its economic assistance the traditional commodity exports of its aid recipients has proved especially attractive to countries perennially pressed for convertible currency. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. has actively encouraged the insistent desire of many new states to industrialize rapidly by concentrating its

aid commitments on the industrial sector.¹² During 1965–1966, for example, the U.S.S.R. extended \$290 million to Iran for construction of a steel mill, a machine tool plant, and a natural gas pipeline. India and Pakistan received sizable economic aid packages for their respective five year plans. Turkey received a \$200 million line of credit for a variety of construction projects. And Syria was given a \$133-million credit for the construction of the first stage of a major dam on the Euphrates River.

The U.S.S.R. has continued to make technical assistance and academic training an important component of its foreign aid program not only because it is aware that the lack of technical and managerial skills in aid recipient countries provide formidable obstacles to the effective implementation of its aid undertakings, but also because such efforts help “deprive the imperialists of important levers of spiritual influence . . . on liberated countries and the dissemination of reactionary, anti-socialist ideas.”¹³ In 1966, almost 12,000 Soviet economic technicians and advisers were present in countries receiving Soviet aid and some 11,000 academic and 1,500 technical students were undergoing training in the U.S.S.R. Many thousands more were being trained on the job at Soviet-assisted projects in developing countries, and at many of the some 90 technical institutes and vocational schools that have been or are currently being constructed with Soviet help.¹⁴

The novel venture of planning and executing a foreign aid program over the past dozen years, however, must have been a sobering experience for Soviet leaders. Aid administrators have encountered frustrating delays in implementing aid projects, often as much from their own ineptitude and inexperience as from the administrative inefficiency of aid

recipients in marshaling domestic resources and financing local costs. Many new states have exhibited what must seem to the Kremlin a disconcerting lack of gratitude for Soviet aid by maintaining an independent foreign policy posture and by preserving their non-aligned status. And the decline of especially receptive leaders in Indonesia, Ghana and elsewhere offered persuasive evidence of the transitory nature of Soviet influence despite substantial outlays.

In contrast to the extravagant optimism that has characterized Soviet aid thinking in recent years, Moscow now seems disposed to assess more realistically just what it can expect from its economic aid commitments abroad. It has evidenced a more cautious and businesslike approach to aid-giving. It has reviewed more critically the feasibility and repayments prospects of proposed new aid projects. And it has committed a larger share of its new aid in the form of so-called trade or commercial credits, i.e., credits to finance exports of Soviet capital equipment carrying a shorter amortization period and higher rates of interest than its traditional project aid. Although these more stringent criteria for aid-giving may tend to slow the pace of new Soviet economic aid extensions, implementation of the large backlog of unexpended credits should maintain the program at current levels for some time to come.

AID PATTERNS

The pattern of Moscow's recent aid extensions also suggests that, in pursuit of its political ambitions in the area, it will seek to expand economic relations with regimes which have generally been regarded as more conservative than radical, and more pro-Western than neutralist in political orientation—without at the same time neglecting its older aid clients. Soviet aid extensions to Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have provided Moscow a wedge into such defensive Western alliance systems as SEATO and CENTO, and offers of aid to Brazil, and more recently to Chile, indicate that the Soviet Union may be expanding its aid and trade horizons to that relatively neglected continent.

¹² Of the more than 600 projects that the U.S.S.R. has undertaken to construct in developing countries, about 70 per cent (in terms of value) are related to industrial development, primarily the hydroelectric and thermal power industry, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, and the machine building industry. *Vneshnaya Torgovlya*, No. 8 (August, 1966), p. 8.

¹³ *Kommunist*, No. 17 (November, 1964), p. 31.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–8.

Since 1956, the U.S.S.R. has delivered more than \$4 billion worth of military equipment to developing countries, often at substantial discounts, and on terms roughly comparable to its economic aid commitments. This sizable infusion of Soviet arms has afforded Moscow an even wider spectrum of opportunities to further its political ambitions than that provided by trade promotion or economic aid. Military aid has the advantage of quicker implementation and a more immediate identification with the national interests of the recipient country. Through its willingness to respond quickly with military assistance to countries which have asked for it, the U.S.S.R. has helped maintain (although indeed not always successfully) favored regimes in power against internal subversion. Through arms aid, the U.S.S.R. has developed a number of states whose armies are largely or almost totally equipped with Soviet weaponry, and which are in a continual state of financial obligation and dependence on the U.S.S.R. for logistical and technical support. Repayments by arms aid recipients—often in the major commodity exports of these countries—have helped serve another Soviet objective by resulting in a substantial rerouting of the exports of these countries away from traditional markets and to the U.S.S.R. Finally, Moscow has believed that in many new states the real locus of power resides in the military establishment. The large number of military personnel from arms recipients who have undergone training in the U.S.S.R. and the thousands of Soviet military technicians and advisers in developing countries have afforded the U.S.S.R. opportunities for prolonged contact and rapport with an elite through which it has hoped to exert substantial influence on the orientation of existing regimes, and, ultimately, on the choice of their successors.

But for the U.S.S.R., no less than for the West, military aid is at best a calculated risk. As Moscow has distributed military equipment to some 20 developing countries—often mutually hostile nations with inimical power interests—it has enmeshed Soviet policy in a web of conflicting commitments and has

served to limit Soviet options. Moreover, as the recent Arab-Israeli war must have graphically demonstrated to Soviet policy-makers, a military aid program provides the donor with only limited influence to insure that such arms will always be used at a time and a place which accord with its own interests.

In addition, the costs of the Soviet military aid venture have risen in recent years. An initial advantage to the U.S.S.R. of its military aid effort was that Moscow was able to offer military equipment at very little cost to itself by delivering primarily obsolescent weapons made available by its own modernization program. Although the U.S.S.R. in the past may have discounted the cost of its military aid as in large part obsolete or redundant to the needs of its own armed forces or of those of other Warsaw Pact countries, the U.S.S.R. has been obliged to export increasing quantities of more costly late-model equipment, under the pressure of competition among developing countries for the prestige and enhanced military capabilities offered by more sophisticated weaponry.

Soviet military aid has also seriously aggravated the repayments burden of arms aid recipients, most of which are also substantial beneficiaries of Soviet economic aid. Some countries, notably Indonesia and the U.A.R., have already requested and received various forms of relief from their debt servicing obligations to the U.S.S.R. But Moscow may prove unwilling in the future to view with equal equanimity the prospects of continuing default on repayments by its military aid

(Continued on page 242)

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The leaders of the Soviet Union want their Golden Anniversary to "mark the beginning of the Soviet Union as a great power with a mature, advancing economy and a new political and social regime."

The Fiftieth Anniversary: A Soviet Watershed?

By DAVID T. CATTELL

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THE OVERTHROW of Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the fall of 1964 was first interpreted as the beginning of a new power struggle or as the overthrow of an uncouth, erratic leader by his colleagues. But in the perspective of events over the past two and one half years it is possible to see it as another event marking the end of the Stalin era.

Khrushchev himself had tried to mark the end of the Stalin system by denouncing Stalin's rule by terror. But at the same time, despite earlier appeals to collective rule, he increasingly stressed that one-man rule in the tradition of Lenin was necessary to finish the construction of socialism and complete the transition to communism. He argued that beginning with the purges in the mid 1930's Stalin had sabotaged his own goals and that he, Khrushchev, had become the true bearer of the Leninist tradition, to rectify the mistakes and open new paths to communism. The overthrow of Khrushchev seems to have been an attempt by the elite to bring a final end to the one-man, charismatic system in favor of collective rule. Thus far the attempt seems to be successful.

It is significant that with the overthrow of Khrushchev the new leadership looked on the Stalin era in a more positive light, stressing that Stalin had brought industrialization and had successfully turned Russia into a great

power. But in approving of Stalin's accomplishments, the new leaders have also made it clear that the usefulness of Stalinism has ended. They have concluded that government policy can no longer be based on the balance of terror and the whims of one man. The machinery has become too intricate and too complex to withstand the shock of idiosyncratic and fanciful schemes of an unchecked tyrant. Losses from such disruptions can be highly dangerous and irreversible. There is no question that Khrushchev's decision not to produce missiles at maximum capacity but rather to hide behind the bluff of great scientific superiority as exemplified by the *Sputniks* created a missile gap and increased Soviet military inferiority. The handicap will not be overcome for several years at least. Even the most rational of tyrants, furthermore, can no longer be expected to comprehend the complexity of a modern industrial state.

In eliminating Khrushchev, his colleagues were equally motivated by personal reasons. An increasing number of people separately and in groups have developed a major stake in the smooth and continuous operation of the Soviet system and these individuals and groups have become more and more powerful politically since the death of Stalin. The elite no longer want their personal fate, any more than that of the country, to be dependent on

the arbitrary whims of one man. Above all the elite are demanding personal security.

As a transitional figure, in many ways the product of the revolutionary and Stalinist period, Khrushchev utilized some of the traditional Soviet methods which were becoming unacceptable in the post-totalitarian, managerial state. Thus, while Khrushchev helped to bring about the end of terror, he nevertheless continued the traditional strategy of meeting crises and problems by mass campaign and assaults. For example, disregarding secondary consequences or costs, Khrushchev mobilized the youth and the agricultural sector to meet the agricultural crisis by plowing up vast virgin lands. To increase the supply of fodder and produce more meat and milk, Khrushchev drew on his impressions of American successes and commanded all collective farms throughout the U.S.S.R. to grow corn. To solve the agricultural crisis and the industrial crisis, he ordered the expansion of the chemical industry several-fold to produce fertilizers and new plastics as a means of saving vital metals. To overcome bureaucratic and party crises, he tried to shatter the economic hierarchy and decentralize the industrial system into more than 100 economic regions.

The assault technique was an attempt to revive revolutionary enthusiasm. Such enthusiasm no longer had any appeal, especially among the elite, and had little applicability to the complex problems of a modern economy. As a result, Khrushchev's campaigns were not only ineffective but were uneconomic. Increasingly, the single most important factor in the further development of the economy was the need for a more efficient allocation of resources. With growth, demands for capital have increased many-fold and, at the same time, because of increased consumption by the population and growing expenditures on the part of the military, space and foreign commitments, the rate of accumulation has been seriously limited. Improved productivity and efficiency are the primary answers to this problem; unfortunately, Khrushchev's "assaultism" was incompatible with this solution. Thus the fiftieth anniversary of the

Russian Revolution seems to mark the end of revolutionary methods of administration and an attempt to be economically rational.

The wastefulness and eccentric quality of Khrushchev's style might have been overlooked had he been able to give his regime a vision around which society could have been mobilized for the future. The symbols of Stalin and his image of the future were effectively destroyed by the time of the 1956 upheavals in East Europe. By means of the new party program of 1961, several years of discussion, and flamboyant speeches, Khrushchev tried to resurrect Lenin and define the transition to communism by means of the withering away of the state and its replacement by public organs and a society of affluence. But this program made little impression, since the Communist party was to remain all powerful. In large part, it was merely more of the same old propaganda and among the sceptical and increasingly sophisticated Soviet population Khrushchev's potpourri had little influence.

SEARCH FOR A NEW MODEL

In trying to draw a final curtain on the Stalin mode of rule, the post-Khrushchev leaders are gradually and empirically coming to realize that it is necessary not only to reject the old but to create a post-totalitarian equilibrium to encourage new stability and growth. A new, dynamic model is necessary if the Soviet Union is to avoid the economic and political fate of Argentina after the fall of Peron. In the Communist bloc, the Soviet Union is not alone in trying to find a new basis for expansion and political stability. In somewhat different forms, the same problem faces most of the East European satellites.

In seeking a post-totalitarian model, the Soviet Union does not have the advantage of Germany and Japan, where the totalitarian system was brought to an abrupt end in defeat. A large residue of the old institutions, the attitudes and the Stalinist-trained bureaucracy remains to block change. But the recent crises in agriculture and industry, and the waves of social change which have resisted indoctrination and have occasionally broken

into open violence in the Soviet Union and East Europe now make adjustments imperative. The question is how to find a new tempo which will preserve unity, expand the country's economic and power position, and provide an ideology around which to mobilize the population.

Thus, in effect, the new leadership is facing a major identity crisis and the basic issues and dilemmas of the Soviet system must be re-evaluated. Is Russian communism to abandon its dream of a communal utopia, in which the individual defines his fulfillment in terms of surrender and work for the collective? Should it adopt as its stated goal the working hypothesis of the system—the recognition of individual, material incentives as primary ends in themselves? With the possibility of affluence around the corner, a choice must be made. There is little question what the masses would choose and be willing to work for, but this means a major readjusting of the system and its myths. Similarly, the leaders are being forced to decide between a complete command economy where all important decisions are centralized, and the introduction of widespread consumer and individual enterprise decision-making. In the political field, there is a question of party control versus an expansion of autonomous group self-regulation. Stalin himself, in 1937, was forced to accept the partial autonomy of the family as a means of stabilizing society. Professional and social groups are pressing for the same independence. In foreign relations, the crucial dilemma between national and international goals also calls for some kind of revolution. It becomes increasingly difficult to follow both goals simultaneously.

Khrushchev was not unaware of many of these problems. It is significant that many of the current reforms were begun by Khrushchev but today are being approached cautiously and through that pragmatic experimentation which is the earmark of the nonrevolutionary style of the new leadership. The first step in this new pragmatism has been a realistic recognition of the seriousness of the economic problems, the need for reasonable economic goals and the necessity for the

efficient allocation of resources. Thus while the 1966–1970 five year plan continues to call for a significant growth rate, the targets are comparatively modest and should be achievable without significantly straining or imbalancing the economy.

TRADITIONAL METHODS

But for all its realism and recognition of the need to adopt new methods compatible with a developed economy, the present leadership in large part thus far has been applying traditional methods. This is not surprising, since the vast majority of the decision-makers still represent a carryover from the past. One of the consequences of a utopian philosophy such as Marxism is the belief that perfection is possible; the only problem is finding the right formula. Thus a favorite tactic of the Communists has been rejuvenging the governmental structure to find the perfect organization. The new leaders immediately reversed the radical organizational changes of Khrushchev; they returned to a system of centralized ministries in the Stalin pattern, abolishing economic regions as key decision centers, restoring party unity by ending the split into economic and industrial sectors, and abolishing the single, enlarged organ of control for both the party and government. Even the commanding organ of the party has been returned to its traditional name, *Politbureau*. Although the new leadership has avoided drastic structural reforms, it nevertheless continues to shuffle the ministries. For example, it recently changed the organization and structure of the committees and ministries dealing with construction, and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. has been increased from 84 to 90 members between August, 1965, and May, 1967.

The leaders even continued to assault problems by launching mass campaigns, but it is significant that they were confined to propaganda campaigns or to matters dealing primarily with the party and social questions such as expanding control and recreational programs for the young. Immediately on assuming the post of first secretary, Leonid Brezhnev launched still another campaign to

revitalize the party and improve political indoctrination. The attempt reached its peak at the 23d party congress in the spring of 1966. At the same time, Brezhnev withdrew the party cadres from administering the economy directly and returned them to their traditional and ambiguous role of overseeing the economy with immediate responsibility for its success. There is little evidence that the party has in fact been revitalized. The growing professionalization and specialization of the bureaucracy continues gradually to undermine the effect of party control. The one hope seems to be in raising the technical competence of the party cadres.

Of greater import for the future of the country has been the conscious effort by the new leadership to stabilize the decision-making apparatus of the government, not only by returning to familiar patterns but, most important, by keeping the same personnel in office. Except for removing some of Khrushchev's special cronies, personnel in the top echelons has remained remarkably stable. There seems also to be a concerted effort to keep the younger generation out of top positions. For example, Alexander Shelepin, the most likely candidate for a top position among the younger generation, was recently demoted from command of the vast security organization and was put in charge of the trade unions. This appears to have been a further check on the younger leaders. In the Central Committee of the party, after the fall of Khrushchev, only some 5-6 per cent of the members were less than 45 years of age and the majority were over 55. The pattern is similar in the top positions at the republic and *oblast* level. It is significant that the 23d congress in 1966 repealed that section of the 1961 statutes of the party calling for the rotation of cadres. Such discrimination against younger bureaucrats is made possible partly because their ranks were decimated by the war. Nevertheless, the pressure of new generations may in time develop into a major problem.

The basic mode of decision-making in the Soviet Union has also changed. The Politbureau has moved a long way from the to-

talitarian model of a single man or body at the top arbitrarily dictating policy and expecting all units of the system to fall unquestioningly into line. The aging Politbureau and, to a lesser extent, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. have become instead the final arbitrators and conciliators in a hierarchy, deciding and compromising among competing demands and programs. Obedience is still expected and the leadership still has power to enforce its decisions but, compared to the awesome purges and terror of the Stalin days, the weapons are mild and humane.

IMPORTANCE OF ADAPTABILITY

Although stability is the key to maintaining the unity of the system, adaptability is equally important to survival in the changing environment. While rejecting Khrushchev's proclivity for sweeping changes, the new leadership has been experimenting along many of the same lines. This experimentation has taken several forms. Least dangerous to the Soviet Union is observation of the progress of the economic and social reforms in Eastern Europe. The satellites and associate states can afford to test more drastic methods because, if they fail, they can be bailed out by the Soviet Union. The reverse, of course, would not be true. Within the Soviet Union the small republics, particularly the more advanced Baltic republics, are utilized to try out new schemes and are encouraged to initiate minor reforms of their own. It was Khrushchev who first encouraged the smaller republics in this manner, and in the recentralization process the Baltic republics, at least, seem to have retained a large measure of autonomy. These republics have been particularly active in education, housing organization, and plant and collective farm autonomy.

In the U.S.S.R. as a whole, economic reforms have thus far been modest. They include granting an increasing number of enterprises limited autonomy, halfway attempts to make prices more realistic (that is, related to scarcity and cost), and a limited reliance on consumer buying to plan output. Thus

far these are only halfway measures which may prove self-defeating. But what is even more confusing is the simultaneous experimentation in the other direction, that is, improving methods of tightening central controls. Thus, by means of computers, linear programming and standardization, attempts are being made to make planning even more inclusive. For example, in many fields such as education, housing construction and maintenance, trade, and transportation the research institutes in Moscow are developing elaborate formulas and rigid standards as a means to control and improve services.

In the long run, probably the most useful trend has been to allow limited discussion, investigation and even individual research by all organized groups in society. Although the scope of debate, particularly on social questions, has not been so free and challenging to established custom as it is in the West, more and more people are being drawn into discussion and experimentation. The continuous professional exchanges with Western countries have acted as further stimuli; in fact, the Soviet leaders are particularly concerned about a too rapid influx from the West which could be destructive to stability. They try to restrict and control it as much as possible.

In order to improve research on long-neglected social and political questions, the leadership has revived the disciplines of sociology and political science. Although the level of work in these fields is still rudimentary and tightly controlled, it is significant that the party is already complaining that the plant sociologists investigating and advising on worker-manager relations are undermining the position of the party.

DILEMMA OF FREE DISCUSSION

Although it is easy to relax restrictions on free discussion, it is difficult to keep it under control. Some criticism of the past and even of the present system is recognized as valuable, but the regime would like to draw clear limits. Thus, on the one hand, the severe punishment of the two writers, Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavski — who published critical works

abroad—and the attempt to revive the Writers' Union as a control instrument at the congress in May, 1967, were moves to impose greater censorship. On the other hand, the regime did not punish those writers who boycotted and petitioned the congress for general and individual tolerance, nor did it do more than verbally chastise the editors of *Novy Mir* who have led the liberalization movement. The liberals are even fully represented on the board of the Writers' Union. Clearly, the leadership hopes that in time the intellectuals will respect voluntarily the areas of taboo.

But the real danger to the reforms does not seem to be that they may mushroom and lead to revolution. Rather, it is the legacy of Stalinism that threatens to sabotage the changes. Both the government and party bureaucrats, nurtured under the old regime with its special system of incentives, are openly dragging their feet against the reforms. Some organs, such as the conservative Ministry of Finance, seem to be able to sabotage structural and incentive changes at all levels with relative impunity. Complaints against such entrenched bureaucrats are frequent but they seem to have little effect. The party bureaucrats are particularly sensitive about losing their prerogatives, since increased specialization has already undermined their authority. The ossification and resistance of the bureaucracy has been further enhanced by dropping the Stalinist policy of shifting personnel from place to place and from position to position, and by holding back the younger bureaucrats. High turnover remains only in the lower echelons and among the young bureaucrats seeking better opportunities. The main exception to bureaucratization of the hierarchy can be found in some scientific circles. Even in the Stalinist period, the physical scientists were the most privileged group and over the last decade their status has continued to improve. Today they are able to pursue their scientific goals with a minimum of interference and with apparently maximum support.

As might be expected, the reforms themselves, as they are even partially successful,

have side effects that bring new problems. Among certain strata, the increased use of material incentives has created tremendous buying power, pressing for hard goods luxury items, such as better apartments and automobiles. Furthermore, the promise of even greater affluence arouses popular expectations and brings demands for an increasing share of the national income. At the same time, class stratification becomes even more pronounced as a consequence of other aspects of the reform. By granting plant managers the power and incentive to cut costs through reducing the labor force, unemployment has been on the rise in some areas. This will become an increasingly serious problem once the present economic reforms are extended to the whole economy. Discussions in the press have pointed to the need to establish labor exchanges as one means to relocate workers.

As Soviet society has become more urban and less isolated through international exchanges and tourism, it has been experiencing the same social ills and instability that have been sweeping over the rest of the world. The Soviet Union would like to blame all these ills—such as juvenile delinquency, nihilism, civil disobedience, and race conflict—on the bourgeois West. It is true that the form and most of the ideas of the social revolt are Western in origin, but the Soviet Union today is particularly susceptible to these movements. De-Stalinization led to the almost complete loss of traditional Communist values in Soviet society and neither Khrushchev nor the present leadership have been able to revive the revolutionary values or lay the basis for new social mores.

This weakness can be seen in their handling of social problems. For example, on July 26, 1966, the party and government passed new and harsh decrees on public law and order, to deal with the rapid increase in crime and general disorderliness among the population. They sharply increased punishment, particularly for petty crimes and hooliganism, and gave the militia much more discretion. At the same time, they decreed another campaign of political indoctrination of the youth.

Inability to create new values is symptomatic of the paramount weakness of the post-Stalin regime; that is, the absence of a new vision or dynamic appeal. The traditional utopia of communism has been given up, even though some parts are still mouthed, because they are not considered feasible in a modern society or because they are no longer attractive to a population steeped in the search for the individual affluence of the mid-twentieth century. Nonetheless, the Soviet leaders continue to reject Russian pre-revolutionary values and any goals originating in the West. They are wary of the tendency of some Soviet intellectuals to revive the individualistic trends of pre-revolutionary Russia; so they have refused to allow the humanism of Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago* and other underground works to be distributed in the Soviet Union.

It is the traditional Russian values and the revival of earlier humanistic sentiments which, more than any other single factor, dominate and give Soviet society some cohesion. Yet Soviet leaders are unwilling to follow this trend. While they have rejected the totally mobilized society of Stalinism, they maintain a system which essentially is centrally directed and requires a population mobilized for its support. For this purpose, the values of pre-revolutionary individualism are not acceptable. Nevertheless, some new recognized goals—other than personal prosperity—are needed. At present the alternatives which seem the most easily available are to arouse popular interest for the spread of international communism or for the achieve-

(Continued on page 243)

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Considering the past 50 years of Soviet economic growth and the difficulties that continue to plague the economy, this specialist concludes that "even the most unrelenting critic of the Soviet Union would have to agree that the U.S.S.R. managed to transform an underdeveloped country into a highly industrialized society."

Soviet Economic Growth Since the Revolution

By MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

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A GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY is a time for sentimentality and celebration; it is also a time for reflection. Thus the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution is an appropriate occasion for taking stock and evaluating the success of the Soviet economic experiment.

Such appraisals are going on among scholars all over the world, both publicly and privately. Undoubtedly many Soviet citizens themselves are asking a fundamental question: have the revolution and its aftermath been warranted? If they have survived the first four decades of the revolution, most Soviet citizens would probably answer that the country's economic growth has more than compensated for the upheaval. The U.S.S.R. today is the world's second largest industrial and political power. Yet even in this jubilee year of festivity, not everything is as the Soviet leaders would like it. Such frustrations as the defection of Svetlana Stalina Alliluyeva, the death of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov and the debacle of Russia's Middle East adventure not only blemish the celebration but also suggest some of the deeper problems that have yet to be resolved.

Vexations also exist in the economic field. Although over-all economic growth in the Soviet Union has been impressive, many people in the U.S.S.R. feel that it could have

been more vigorous. Moreover, there is reason to suspect that perhaps the same results could have been achieved with considerably less trauma. Outguessing history is a risky business at best, and one that the economist attempts with considerable diffidence. But if ever the results of the Russian Revolution are to be "second-guessed," the perspective of 50 years makes this an appropriate occasion to do so.

Speculation about what might have been is usually wasted effort. Yet sometimes such speculation may be of value, especially if it can be shown that other courses of action might have been equally suitable. In their urgent desire to move forward, leaders of the developing countries frequently lack the time to make a balanced appraisal. Unless they are shown otherwise, they often seem to favor that course of action which has made the greatest impression on them. Consequently, because of what appears to be its unique record of success, these impatient leaders often single out the pattern of Soviet economic development as *the* proven model, and give scant, if any, consideration to alternatives. The question remains: were there alternatives worth considering?

One of the basic characteristics of the Soviet model of economic development is the collectivization of agriculture. Because of the

resistance of the peasants to the desires of the state, it has long been an accepted argument in the Soviet Union that the Soviet government would have been unable to extract any marketable surplus from the peasants for urban use and export purposes without such a draconic measure. But the reaction of the peasants to the state was largely a reflection of the inconsistent way in which the new Soviet government treated them. After the revolution, the peasants and returning soldiers had been encouraged by Lenin to confiscate the land. Unfortunately, in the chaos, inflation and counterrevolution that followed, force had to be used to separate the peasant from his harvest because food supplies were moving so slowly to the cities. Conditions improved for a time under the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) as the peasants were encouraged to engage in private trade for profit. But a few years later, Stalin embarked on an all-out course of industrialization, and he decided he would have to finance his drive by diverting resources from the rural sector to heavy industry. This meant that consumer goods would be neglected.

Again, many authorities began to anticipate that the peasants would start to hold back on the amount being marketed. After all, why should the peasant work hard in the fields only to find there were no consumer goods in the store? Such a reaction seemed to be a logical pattern of response. Backing up logic, Stalin presented statistical evidence of just such a slowdown. The data was presented on May 28, 1928, and the following winter Stalin ordered the collectivization of agriculture.

This evoked tremendous hostility and resistance. As Stalin later acknowledged to Churchill, millions of lives were lost under a pressure that Stalin said was worse than that of World War II. Nevertheless, according to the figures used by Stalin, grain marketings did increase.

In a brilliant article earlier this year, Jerzy F. Karcz of the University of California has

shown that the entire justification for Stalin's drive for collectivization was false.¹ Karcz argues that Stalin confused two sets of figures. According to Stalin, *gross marketings* by the peasants of grain in 1913 were 21.3 million tons, or 26 per cent of the harvest. It contrast, Stalin indicated deliveries fell in 1926–1927, by half, to 10.3 million tons or 13.3 per cent of the harvest. According to Karcz, however, Stalin did not contrast comparable figures. It was as if he compared onions and cheddar cheese. At best, one ends up with a fancy before-dinner appetizer; at worst, with a case of economic indigestion.

Although production fell, Karcz proves convincingly that if Stalin had been statistically consistent, he would have used the figures of *gross marketings* for the 1926–1927 period. Instead, for reasons that are not entirely clear (he may not even have realized what he was doing), Stalin used a *net marketing* concept. This was of necessity a lower figure, because it represented *gross marketing* minus any grain the peasants bought for themselves. And after fulfilling their delivery obligations, the peasants had actually repurchased large quantities of grain. This seemingly abnormal reaction on their part was due to the fact that the price of grain was kept artificially low to prevent excess profiteering by the peasants. With such low prices, the peasants found it profitable to buy back the grain and use it for feed for their livestock, which were selling at a very high price.

If Stalin had been consistent and had used a *gross marketing* figure for 1926–1927, he would have been forced to conclude that marketings had not really fallen seriously. *Gross marketings* in 1926–1927 were 16.2 million tons, or 20.7 per cent of the harvest. This is a drop from the 26 per cent of 1913, but not so much as everyone had been led to believe. Moreover, the drop in grain production and marketing was more than offset by an increase in the production of higher protein products, such as milk and meat. Therefore the total amount marketed, including grain and animal products, actually rose. Similarly, Karcz shows that the fall in grain exports was partially offset by a rise

¹ "Thoughts on the Grain Problem," *Soviet Studies*, April, 1967, p. 339.

in export of other farm products. Instead of the pessimism and concern that followed Stalin's incorrect use of marketing figures, there should have been optimism and hope. The switch in production and marketing to high protein foods is usually considered the mark of economic development.

The important point is that the policy of collectivization was not so necessary as we have come to think. If anything, there is good reason to believe that economic progress could also have been made with more moderate policies. Furthermore, the increased production stimulated by a slightly higher price for grain would probably not have resulted in a transfer of economic wealth from the urban to the rural sector. On the contrary, if there had been no collectivization, there would not have been so much suffering and protest. This in turn would have meant increased production on the farm and a better standard of living for the urban residents.

As long as we are speculating, let us carry our hypothesis a long step forward. What would have happened had the February revolution not been followed by the October revolution of the Bolsheviks? Could the U.S.S.R. have developed as strong an economy as it has today?

Such a question requires not only an open mind, but also many assumptions. First, let us assume that the Czar had been overthrown in the February revolution of 1917, but that the Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky had managed to retain control. Then the Bolsheviks would not have come to power as they did during the October revolution; the counterrevolution and destruction during the 1917-1921 period would probably have been avoided; and there would have been a quicker return to prewar economic conditions.

Second, we can assume that without the Bolsheviks, there would not have been the chaos of collectivization. In any case, as we have just seen, even with the Bolsheviks, collectivization could have been avoided.

Without the counterrevolution and collectivization the Russians would have had at least ten more years for growth. If so, there would have been less need for intensive growth in the years that followed. Therefore, the Russians might have been able to attain the same level of economic development without as much pressure and anguish. To be fair, it must also be acknowledged that some of this extra growth might have been offset by the effects of the depression which affected much of the rest of the world. But even then the Russians might have been able to grow just as fast under an alternative economic system.

With ten more years to expand, what rates of economic growth would have been necessary to grow as well as the Soviets actually did? Let us assume either that the whole period of the 1920's and 1930's was a time of growth (except for the war period), or that the U.S.S.R. did not expand during the first seven years of the 1930's because of the depression. In both cases, we shall determine what the minimum rate of growth would have had to be in order to carry the U.S.S.R. to 650 per cent of its 1913 GNP, the economic level it eventually attained in 1966-1967. If we assume there was no stagnation during the depression, the Soviet Union would only have had to grow at a rate of 5.2 per cent since 1920. If we assume a pause for the depression, a rate of 6.4 per cent would have been required.

Could the Russians have attained an average growth of either 5.2 per cent or 6.4 per cent over a 40-year period without communism? That is the big question. Sustained high growth rates prior to 1920 were not common. However, it appears that Russia grew at a rate of about 8 per cent in the decade of the 1880's.² Moreover, in the years after World War II, such high rates were not unusual. During the period of 1958-1964, Japan reached a rate of 12 per cent. Even the United States exceeded a rate of 4 per cent during the past ten years.

Yet showing that something is theoretically possible is not the same as proving that it could have been done. However, the purpose here is merely to suggest that the Soviet ex-

² Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 129-133.

perience is not unique, and indeed that other economic systems have been even more productive. Certainly, a different system might have been less destructive. This in itself may be an important conclusion for those who have been forced to argue that there was no alternative.

AN IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE

But enough talk about what could have been; what did happen? Even the most unrelenting critic of the Soviet Union would have to agree that the U.S.S.R. managed to transform an underdeveloped country into a highly industrialized society. After all, whether the Soviet accomplishment could have been attained in some other way cannot detract from the fact that the Russians did expand their economy six-fold. Nor is this achievement diminished by recognizing that Russia was not a wasteland in 1913 (it had a solid but small core of heavy industry) and that the present level of industrialization in the U.S.S.R. is highly uneven. In the span of 50 years, the Russians have managed to transform a predominantly peasant population into a fairly well-trained urban working force. While the level of training is not always equivalent, the Russians graduate more engineers each year than the United States. In many areas of space and military technology and even in some areas of industrial activity, the Russians have outpaced the United States.

There has also been a considerable material improvement for the individual citizen since the revolution. Although the quality and quantity of consumer goods and especially housing are still not on a par with those in most nations of West Europe, there have been immense gains, especially since Stalin's death. Progress has been made in intangible matters also. Thus, with only minor exceptions, most Russians have no conception of unemployment, or what it means to worry about job security. In most areas of the country and in most occupations, there is a shortage of labor. As we shall see, this is sometimes a mixed blessing but, on the whole, it is a notable achievement. Similarly, literacy

rates are said to have reached close to 98 per cent of the adult population. Moreover, a system of universal free medicine has been provided for a long time. Of course, the scheme is financed by means of higher taxes, so the service is not really free, and the quality of care by American standards of private care is sometimes shocking; but on the whole, Soviet medical care is impressive.

DIFFICULTIES BEGIN

Amid the general satisfaction over the performance of the Soviet economy, some worrisome signs began to appear that are potentially of greater significance than the grief caused by Madame Alliluyeva, Cosmonaut Komarov and Adventurer Nasser. The Soviet rate of growth fell sharply after 1958 to about 5.3 per cent. Since it had averaged 7 per cent over the preceding three decades, this was cause for alarm. Although the growth rate improved again, in 1966-1967, the Russians have come to realize that they must henceforth contend with a series of never-ending problems, some of them familiar to other mature industrial economies.

After 1958, the mistakes of the collectivization campaign came back to plague the Soviets. Russia, which in prerevolutionary days was one of the world's largest exporters of grain, suddenly found that its larders were bare. In a surprising move, the Soviet Union turned to Canada to purchase \$500 million worth of grain in 1963 (plus \$140 million from the United States) and \$450 million more in 1965. Embarrassing as this was, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared that the importation of grain was an improvement over conditions in 1947 when Stalin simply let the people starve during a similar shortage.³ But it was clear by the early 1960's that the agricultural sector had been exploited as much as it could be; henceforth resources would have to be added to rather than taken out of agriculture if there were to be any further economic growth.

As part of the same problem the Russians discovered that they had run out of labor reserves. Previously, they had encouraged the flow of manpower from the agricultural to

³ *Prauda*, December 10, 1963, p. 1.

the industrial sector. Now, because of the obvious problems in agriculture, this flow had to be stopped, if not reversed. To the extent that new flows of labor to industry were reduced, the growth of industrial output was adversely affected. Previously, capital had always been the factor of production in short supply. However, as long as there was an endless flow of labor, capital productivity could be increased even if capital were scarce simply because labor could be used so intensively. In the late 1950's, this was no longer possible and, as a partial consequence, capital productivity fell sharply. This was reflected in a sharp rise in the capital-output ratio, which rose from less than 4-to-1 in the early 1950's to 8-to-1 in the years following 1958.⁴

The fall in capital productivity created considerable concern. Since the reduced capital productivity was not offset by a higher rate of investment, it was inevitable that the growth rate of the GNP⁵ would fall. There was no absolute drop in the GNP, but the fall in the rate of growth from about 7 per cent to about 3 per cent was serious.

REFORM AT HOME

Recognizing the need for change within the Soviet enterprise itself, several Soviet economists offered a series of suggestions. Even though fresh reserves of labor had dwindled, many other steps could be taken. For instance, instead of using labor-extensive means of production, the planners could switch to labor-intensive techniques. But this would mean that capital would have to be used more effectively. This could be achieved not only by utilizing more skilled workers, which was already being done, but also by encouraging more innovation and more efficient use of capital, neither of which was being done. The big question was how to accomplish these latter aims. The issuance

of a governmental order demanding more innovation and more rational use of capital would be a wasted effort unless the managers of enterprises using capital equipment could see that it was in their self-interest to follow such an order. It was decided that this would require a restructuring of managerial incentives, and reliance on foreign markets.

With the aim of stimulating the manager to work more effectively, it was proposed that the incentive system be radically altered. Until late 1965, the main determinant of bonuses for the worker and the manager was the extent to which the plan targets were fulfilled. Since 1927-1928, when the First Five Year Plan was introduced, each enterprise had been assigned a specific target. Depending on the product being produced, the target was in some measurable form, for example, tons of cement, feet of cloth or thousands of nails. If the manager fulfilled his plan, he received something like a 10 per cent bonus. If he did not fulfill it, he received less than his full salary. In contrast, if he overfulfilled his plan, he received something comparable to a progressive piece rate.

Inevitably the manager did his best to see that his assigned target was set low so he could overfulfill his quota. At the same time, if it became evident that he overfulfilled his quota with too much ease, his target was likely to be increased in the next period. The end effect was that the manager held back his production abilities for fear that his target would be jacked up too high. Furthermore, the goods he produced were generally of low quality.

To remedy such distortions, economic reformers such as Evsei Liberman suggested that profits should be used as the main determinant of bonuses. He argued that this would improve the quality of production because the manager would have to insure that he took all the variables into consideration during production, not just tonnage, footage or quantity. Also, to the extent that industrial purchasers were given the right to reject poor quality material, the manufacturer would not be able to sell his merchandise and earn a profit unless he maintained quality.

⁴ A rise in the capital-output ration is unhealthy. It means that it requires more capital to generate a dollar's worth of output. *Current Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R.*, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), June, 1965, p. 16.

⁵ GNP = Gross National Product.

An emphasis on profits, even though most of it would continue to accrue to the state, would still induce the manager to increase the efficiency of his work force. Hopefully, he would seek to maintain the same output with fewer employees and fewer raw materials. This would improve productivity and reduce the impact of the reduced flow of labor from agriculture. Just such a reform, which reduced the role of physical production targets but increased the role of profits and sales, was introduced for a limited number of firms in September, 1965. By late 1968, it is anticipated that all Soviet industry will be operating under the new conditions.

Liberman and the reformers also had several suggestions which they felt would help conserve, and thereby improve, the use of capital. The first step was to make the managers appreciate the fact that capital equipment was in short supply and could not be expended without limitations. Without a charge for capital, the manager had no such appreciation. For ideological reasons, the Russians had treated capital as a free good. But it was not free. Accordingly, as part of the reform initiated in September, 1965, a charge for capital was introduced, and interest on long-term bank loans was required.

Capital resources would also be used more effectively if greater innovation could be stimulated. Previously, attempts at innovation were hampered for at least two reasons: reluctance to disrupt the regular production routine and lack of capital. As long as enterprise activities and bonuses were dependent on the attainment of physical targets, and efforts at product or capital innovation were likely to jeopardize the fulfillment of such targets, no one wanted to stick his neck out for any risky innovation. Under the new system, however, profit targets are to be set several years in advance so that the manager will be encouraged to risk low profits the first year, comforted by the knowledge that he will be able to earn and retain higher profits and bonuses in later years. Hopefully, the manager will also be induced to set his sights higher than in the past, since he need not worry that the successes of one year will lead

automatically to increased goals the next year.

The new reform should also facilitate the acquisition of new capital for innovation. Henceforth, as much as 25 per cent of all capital investment in the Soviet Union will be made at the discretion of the plant manager. Previously, all investment was made centrally. The source of the manager's capital funds will be his depreciation allowance and retained earnings. Therefore, there is additional incentive for the manager to increase his profits.

Although there are many problems, such as the need for meaningful prices, that have yet to be resolved, the reform represents a radical departure from past practice. Fortunately, the realization that operational improvement may be more important than ideological purity has pacified most critics. In fact, the potential of the reform is considered important enough to warrant its introduction into the agricultural sector. Consequently, some farms are now also using profit as their main criterion of successful performance.

REFORM AWAY FROM HOME

Soviet economic officials have realized that their efforts to speed up economic growth should not be limited to reforms affecting the domestic economy. Although autarchy had been the goal under Stalin, it was clear that foreign markets could provide a shortcut to technological improvement. For many of the reasons just mentioned, the Soviet Union found itself lagging far behind the advances

(Continued on page 243)

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The Bucharest Declaration

A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact nations was held in Bucharest from July 4 to July 6, 1966. Excerpts from its concluding "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe" follow:

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the states party to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, represented at the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, adopt the following Declaration:

I

Enduring peace and security in Europe accord with the ardent desires of all the peoples of the European continent and with the interests of universal peace.

The peoples of Europe, who have made and are making a tremendous contribution to mankind's progress, can and must create in their part of the world a climate of détente and international mutual understanding which would enable each people and each country to employ its material and spiritual resources in conformity with its will and decision.

The state of relations between European countries exerts a strong influence on world affairs. It should not be forgotten that two world wars, which took tens of millions of lives and caused tremendous destruction, broke out on the European continent.

In 1945 the aim of ensuring European security seemed within close reach; the path to that goal, it seemed, was open. German Nazism was overthrown; sentence on it was to be passed. Justice triumphed. The peoples, who had just gone through an unprecedentedly cruel war with Nazi Germany, demanded that everything be done to prevent the forces of militarism and aggression from again interrupting the peaceful life and constructive labours of the present and future generations.

The Potsdam Agreement, which crowned the allied relations of the anti-Hitler coalition powers, proclaimed an extensive programme of peace projected into the future. For the first time in history Europe had a realistic possibility of solving its secur-

ity problem. It was generally accepted that the main condition of European security was the prevention of a revival of German militarism and Nazism, so that Germany would never again threaten her neighbours or world peace. It was also generally accepted that the fulfilment of this main condition required sincere and friendly cooperation of European states, of all states interested in the maintenance of European and universal peace.

However, these aspirations were not justified by subsequent developments. The hopes of the European peoples did not come true. Their desire for a life free of the menace of war has not been realized to this day. The responsibility for that rests with those powers which, immediately after the victory over the Nazi aggressors, renounced the cooperation forged in the great anti-Hitler coalition, refused to steer a common course towards peace in Europe, and, what is more, themselves became the conduits of aggressive policy.

Now, two decades after the end of World War II, its consequences in Europe have not yet been eliminated, there is no German peace treaty, and centres of tension, abnormal situations in the relations between states, continue to exist.

The socialist states signatory to the present Declaration believe that the elimination of this situation, and the creation of firm foundations of European peace and security, require that international relations should proceed from renunciation of the threat or use of force and peaceful settlement of international disputes, and should be based on the principles of sovereignty and national independence, equality and non-interference in internal affairs, and respect of territorial integrity. European states should strive for effective measures to prevent the menace of an armed conflict in Europe, and to strengthen European collective security.

In the opinion of the states participating in this meeting, the present situation requires of all European nations, of all the peace forces, still greater determination and activity to strengthen European peace and security.

The signatories to this Declaration believe that measures to strengthen European security can and should be carried out, first and foremost, in the following main directions.

First. The participants in this meeting appeal to all European countries to promote good-neighbour relations based on the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage—on the principles of peaceful co-existence between states with differing social systems. Accordingly, they urge closer economic and commercial ties, more contacts and diverse forms of cooperation in the domains of science and technology, of culture and the arts, as well as in other fields which provide new opportunities for cooperation among European countries.

Second. The socialist countries have consistently opposed the division of the world into military blocs and alliances and have worked to remove the danger this presents to universal peace and security.

The Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance—a defensive pact of sovereign and equal states with the object of safeguarding the security of its members and European peace—was concluded in reply to the organization of the NATO military aggressive grouping and the inclusion in it of West Germany.

The countries signatory to this Declaration believe that the need has matured for steps to relax the tension, primarily the military tension, in Europe. The radical way to achieve that would be simultaneous dissolution of existing military alliances, and the present situation makes that possible. Our governments have repeatedly declared that if the North-Atlantic alliance is discontinued, the Warsaw Treaty would lose its validity, and the two alliances would then be replaced by a European security system. Our governments now solemnly reaffirm that they are prepared for simultaneous liquidation of the two alliances.

However, if the NATO countries are not yet prepared for complete dissolution of the two groupings, the signatories to this Declaration consider it advisable, already now, to agree on liquidation of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty military organizations. At the same time, they declare that as long as the North-Atlantic alliance exists, and as long as the aggressive imperialist forces continue to encroach on the peace of the world, the socialist countries represented at this meeting will maintain a high degree of vigilance and are determined to strengthen their might and defence capacity.

Third. Of major importance at present are also partial measures towards a military détente in Europe, viz.:

dismantling of foreign military bases;

withdrawal of all foreign troops to within their national boundaries;

reduction of the numerical strength of the armed forces of the two German states on an agreed scale and agreed timetable;

measures to remove the danger of nuclear conflict; establishment of atom-free zones, with a commitment by the nuclear powers not to employ nuclear weapons against countries within these zones, etc.;

cessation of flights by foreign aircraft carrying nuclear and thermonuclear bombs over the territory of European countries, and of entry into the ports of these countries of foreign nuclear-weapon submarines and surface ships.

Fourth. Considering the danger to peace in Europe offered by the G.F.R.'s nuclear claims, all countries must seek to rule out the very possibility of G.F.R. access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, directly or indirectly through alignments, through exclusive control, or in any form whatever of participation in the disposal of such weapons.

Fifth. Inviolability of boundaries is the foundation of durable peace in Europe. Normalcy in Europe requires that all states, in and outside Europe, shall base their foreign policy actions on acceptance of the existing European boundaries that emerged after [World War II].

Sixth. A German peace settlement conforms with the interests of European peace. The socialist countries represented at this meeting are prepared to continue working for a solution of that problem. And any solution must take into account the security interests of all the countries concerned and the security of Europe as a whole.

A constructive approach to this issue, as to other aspects of European security, is possible only if acceptance of the existence of the two German states—the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic—is made the starting point. At the same time, a German peace settlement requires acceptance of existing boundaries and renunciation by both German states of nuclear weapons.

Seventh. The convening of an all-European conference to discuss security and promote European cooperation would represent a big step forward. Agreement reached at such a conference might be formalized, for instance, in a General European Declaration on cooperation in maintaining and consolidating European security. Such a declaration could provide for a pledge by the signatory powers to be guided in their relations with each other by the interests of peace, to resolve controversial questions exclusively by peaceful means, consult with each other and exchange information on matters of mutual interest, facilitate maximum development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural ties. The Declaration would be open to all interested countries.

BOOK REVIEWS

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND POLICIES

COMMUNIST POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 399 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.95.)

It is now generally recognized that communism is not monolithic and that there are important differences in structure, policy and style among the various countries of the socialist "bloc." To provide the basis for comparing these diverse political systems is the function of this excellent and well-edited collection of essays and public statements, drawn from both Communist and non-Communist sources. There are 63 separate items, grouped under such headings as "The Shaping of Consensus," "Governmental Structures and Processes" and "Ideological Differentiation."

For each of these topics Rubinstein has provided a lucid and informative introduction, which serves not only to relate the several items to follow but also to suggest avenues of comparison. This is a useful book for anyone concerned with the ongoing process of differentiation within the Communist world.

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SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNISM: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES.

EDITED BY DONALD W. TREADGOLD. (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1967. 452 pages and index, \$10.00.)

This collection of essays is the outgrowth of a conference whose purpose was to "attempt a systematic if summary examination of the recent past and present of communism (viewed both as ideology and as a political, economic, and social system) in Russia and China on a comparative basis, in order to gain better understanding

of the main structural and developmental features of the two regimes and their doctrines and systems."

The essays are organized under seven topical headings; and the contributors, distinguished specialists from a variety of disciplines, have written splendid essays: integrated analyses which bring to focus the sum of our knowledge and insights on these difficult themes.

A.Z.R.

SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. EDITED BY CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI. (New York: Praeger, 1966. 242 pages and index, \$5.95.)

In the spring of 1966 the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific conducted hearings on the implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for United States foreign policy. This volume contains the statements made before the subcommittee by leading United States and European specialists. The essays are too short to be of interest to the specialist, but they do provide a useful basis for introducing the interested citizen to the complexities of the Sino-Soviet rift and their impact on the West.

A.Z.R.

MANAGERIAL POWER AND SOVIET POLITICS. BY JEREMY R. AZRAEL. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. 258 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.95.)

Social scientists are increasingly discussing the relationship, if any, between industrialization and democracy. Specifically, will the Soviet Union become less authoritarian as it becomes more industrially developed? This study evaluates the impor-

tance of the managerial elite in the Soviet political system. The author organizes his material according to "political generations." He examines "the management doctrines of prerevolutionary Bolshevism to determine the expectations of the new Soviet leaders regarding the relationship between managerial authority and political power." He then discusses the attitudes and behavior of the bourgeois specialists who were engaged in the early years of the Soviet regime, and of the Communists who were predominant during the purges of the 1930's. Finally, he reviews the post-purge generation, and speculates on the cohesiveness and ambitions of the men now entering "the ranks of the managerial elite."

Clearly and persuasively, Azrael argues that managerial prerogatives do not encompass political power, except in certain isolated cases and on narrowly relevant issues. Though acknowledging that the growing complexity of Soviet society requires refined techniques and instruments of control, he believes that these are being developed and that technological advances are not moving the managers into the centers of political power. This is an interesting and thoroughly researched study.

A.Z.R.

THE SOVIET BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT. BY ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Revised and enlarged edition. 599 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.95.)

This distinguished book, which first appeared in 1960, analyzes the origins, evolution, and fragmentation of the once unified Communist world. Though the focus is still on relations between the Soviet Union and the East European countries, there is an expanded treatment of the Sino-Soviet dispute. With skill and insight, Brzezinski traces the transformation of the Soviet bloc into a more complicated alliance system, in which Moscow plays a leading, but no longer unchallenged, role.

This is a masterful account of the interaction between ideology and power among the Communist states.

A.Z.R.

POLAND'S POLITICS. BY ADAM BROMKE. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 316 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.95.)

Geography has historically been at the heart of Poland's problem: situated between Russia and Germany, she has sought to fashion a viable state. Today's Polish dilemma is of the same vintage: "how to widen the scope of her independence from Russia without conceding any territory in the dispute with Germany."

Since fine books on Poland are not common, this study is to be particularly welcomed. Bromke's thesis is that the "discrepancy between Poland's potential and actual status in the world—reflected in a conflict between political idealism and political realism—has been the single most significant phenomenon in Polish political life."

With sureness and scholarly insight he sketches the past hundred years of Poland's political history. However, most of the book discusses the contemporary political situation in Poland. This is a persuasive, informative study that deserves a wide audience.

A.Z.R.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND AMERICAN POLICY. BY BERNARD S. MORRIS. (New York: Atherton Press, 1966. 179 pages, notes and index, \$5.95.)

Bernard S. Morris, professor of government at Indiana University, has written a penetrating analysis of the present state of the international Communist movement. His volume seeks to set in perspective "the schism in the international communist movement and in some measure to relate American policy to this historic world event. . . . Part I presents a schema of

the changes that have occurred in the structure of authority and control of the communist movement over the decades Part II deals with the American reception of the split in international communism and of Khrushchev's policy of accommodation with the United States, which figured as a major factor in the Soviet-Chinese split."

In lucid, compelling fashion, Morris takes a fresh look at the changing relationship between the Soviet state and the international Communist movement in the decades since 1919. He distinguishes between reality and myth, between what the movement actually was and how it was perceived in the United States and how the American "image" of Soviet foreign policy has continually been distorted by the *a priori* assumptions and attitudes of an anti-Communist "ideology." In particular, he sees the deepening involvement in Vietnam as a disturbing indication of Washington's inability to surmount the ideological anticommunism that continues to shape its responses to Soviet and Chinese policies.

This is a rich and rewarding book.

A.Z.R.

RUSSIA, BOLSHEVISM, AND THE VERSAILLES PEACE. BY JOHN M. THOMPSON. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. 429 pages, bibliography and index, \$11.50.)

The inability of the victorious Western leaders to cope with the "Russian question" at the Versailles Conference in 1919 was to have disequilibrating consequences for the political peace and alignments in Europe. In this study, Thompson analyzes the discordant dynamics of Allied policy toward the new Bolshevik regime, as it developed at the peace conference.

A few of the author's principal conclusions may be noted briefly. First, "it seems clear that the inability of the Allies to end the civil war and intervention in Russia and to reach an accommodation with the Bolsheviks embittered their relations with

Soviet Russia and increased the mutual hostility and suspicion which . . . was later so adversely to affect Soviet-Western relations." Second, "it is fair to say that a moderate attitude on the part of the powers at Paris certainly could not have made matters worse. . . ." Third, the absence of Russia from the Versailles Conference "was certainly a disruptive influence on the future course of European history . . . because her potential power and role in Europe could not safely be ignored."

A.Z.R.

SOVIET SOCIALIZED MEDICINE: AN INTRODUCTION. BY MARK G. FIELD. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. 231 pages and index, \$5.00.)

This volume provides a factual and dispassionate "examination, analysis, and partial evaluation of the Soviet approach to medicine and public health." In succinct chapters, Dr. Field discusses the situation of medicine and public health in Russia before 1917, the role of medicine in Soviet ideology, the key developments of the past fifty years, and the operation of the Soviet "medicare" system. In general, he concludes that "Soviet socialized medicine has been one of the more impressive and positive achievements of the Soviet regime, and has probably met with the approval of the great majority of the population."

A.Z.R.

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: RUSSIA 1917-1967. BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. 115 pages, \$3.75.)

This volume contains six lectures dealing with an appraisal of the Soviet Union today in the perspective of the hopes and disillusionments of the past 50 years. The essays are written with the clarity and insight that long distinguished Isaac Deutscher's books.

A.Z.R.

(Continued on page 246)

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

(Continued from page 202)

at oil companies, transportation, and other Western interests. The Russians could see the prospect of a greatly strengthened position for themselves in the Arab world.

The long-range decisions facing the Soviet leaders in the Middle East involved many of the same factors that bore on their choice of a general global strategy. They could reaffirm their ties with the Arab states, renew their supplies of arms, and try to extend Soviet influence and control in the Middle East and Africa at the expense both of the Western powers and of Communist China. To support that political strategy they could build up more naval strength in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea area, secure military bases, and continue efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet. The alternative strategy would be to move toward greater stability in the Middle East, somewhat along the lines of the "Tashkent policy" in the Indian subcontinent. It would place the common Soviet and American interest in peace above the tensions and risks attendant on a drive for substantial new cold-war gains. It would involve some agreements with the United States, explicit or implicit, to curb the arms race in the Middle East and to establish an Arab-Israeli settlement.

The immediate signs, as the acute stage of the Middle East crisis passed, were of renewed Soviet arms deliveries and commitments to the militant Arab states. Syria and Algeria, taking the lead as the deflated Nasser reassessed his situation, vied for Soviet support of a "national-liberation" struggle or an early "next round" with Israel. From all that could be seen, the Kremlin was giving full political and material encouragement to those regimes and to the Arab cause in general, while maintaining its reserve with respect to any military commitment or involvement.

At the same time, Moscow made it quite clear that Arab desires were not to be the tail

wagging the Soviet dog. The fact that Kosygin met Johnson at Glassboro, N.J., in June, 1967, while the bitter U.N. debate was going on, bespoke the Soviet realization of the broader interests at stake. The Middle East was the topic of the day, but the agenda of great power interests on both sides was much broader. It included, as Kosygin himself stated, Vietnam, but even Vietnam was a function of the major policy choices.

Marshall Shulman, in a recent keen analysis of the world scene as it looks from Moscow,⁹ has said the time may be at hand for a basic decision by the Soviet regime. It may choose the hard line, maintaining a tough attitude on Germany and other European questions, heating up the cold war in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world, supporting Hanoi's effort to take over all Vietnam, and moving to a higher stage in the arms race. Or it may choose to concentrate attention on building the Soviet civilian economy, seek a *modus vivendi* in Europe, work for greater stability in the Middle East, help to find a negotiated solution for Vietnam, and negotiate seriously toward an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and toward other measures of arms control. In other words, it could cease trying to compete with China as a revolutionary power and frankly come out for a real peaceful coexistence with the West. American diplomacy has been working for some time to increase the chances that any such crucial Soviet decision would favor this latter alternative.

RUSSIA AND TWO EUROPE

(Continued from page 207)

omy of West Europe and to advocate the intensification of contacts of all sorts between West and East Europe, they are stimulating the development of what may be called the "European Idea," that is, the vision of a reunited Europe, influential on a world scale. Of course, when the Soviets speak of "Europe" and of "all-European" settlements, they are envisioning the Soviet Union as an inte-

⁹ "The Critical Decision for Moscow," *The New Leader*, July 3, 1967, pp. 3-6.

gral part of the European region. It is at the least highly questionable whether the other nations of Europe, East or West, see things quite this way. Russia is a peripheral superpower completely outclassing all other European nations and possessing distant interests—particularly in the Far East—which have little relevance for Europe.

Europe's dominant concerns are continued economic growth and a solution of the German problem. If these two issues could be handled on the basis of closer relations between West and East Europe—and there is evidence in the German recognition episode and the growing East European interest in the E.E.C. that this is now beginning to happen—there would be less and less justification for a Soviet presence in Europe. This is not to say that the struggle over Europe would not continue but rather to assert that it would be a conflict in which Europe itself would be an increasingly integrated and self-reliant Third Force, and not the collection of diverse and semi-integrated units that it is today. The chances of either the Soviet Union or the United States "winning" such a Europe would be slight indeed. Instead, Europe would then constitute a third superpower, playing the balancing role so sorely needed in Soviet-American relations since World War II.

SOVIET AID AND TRADE

(Continued from page 223)

clients, especially by those who have not proved particularly responsive to Soviet political pressure or who have squandered expensive Soviet equipment on ill-conceived military ventures.

Finally, the recent defeat of its Arab military aid clients may have impelled some re-examination of the "socialist reliability" of military or quasi-military regimes in developing countries with which Moscow has been collaborating. In recent years, some Communist ideologists have sought to narrow the gap between Communist dogma and Soviet practice by removing the military in some developing countries from the most reactionary

category of the bourgeoisie (where orthodox Marxism has consigned them) and declaring them to be the "backbone of the revolutionary democratic forces"¹⁵ on whom Moscow counts to implement the transition of their countries to socialism. Others, however, have continued to find such military regimes strange and uncomfortable bedfellows.¹⁶ And in what appears to have been the first authoritative postmortem on the Arab-Israeli war, a Soviet journal attributed the "real cause" of the U.A.R. debacle to the "defeatism" of its "military bourgeoisie," i.e., those generals and senior officers whose privileged position and bourgeois family backgrounds led them to oppose social change, and who were "sickened" by "talk of socialism in the U.A.R. . . ."¹⁷

Hopefully, Moscow may ultimately perceive that it is in its own national interests to halt the destabilizing effects of its arms aid short of major military clashes; certainly in the near term it seems likely that it will seek to impose more stringent controls on the use of its military equipment. But as long as Western restraint and inhibitions fail fully to satisfy the new states' escalating appetites for military hardware—appetites in no small measure actively whetted by the U.S.S.R.—the resultant opportunities for expansion of Soviet influence, harassment of the West, and demonstration of militant support for national liberation movements will continue to make the aid program attractive for Soviet leaders.

¹⁵ K. Ivanov, "National-Liberation Movement and Non-Capitalist Path of Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 5 (May, 1965), p. 63.

¹⁶ *Izvestia*, on January 17, 1967, admitted as much when it declared that whereas "some authors did not want to assign the army a progressive role and define political power established through military coups merely as reactionary and fascist, others try to present the army as just about the only all-national force capable of leading the national liberation movement." *Izvestia* took a centrist position, asserting that the army "may not only play a progressive role . . . but easily become a weapon of the reactionary forces. . . ." Which of the two tendencies in the army, the democratic or the reactionary, will prevail at any given historical stage, it said, will depend on how effective is the revolutionary influence exerted on them.

¹⁷ *Za Rubezhom*, No. 27 (30 June–6 July 1967), p. 7.

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH

(Continued from page 235)

which revolutionized the chemical, electronics and computer fields in other countries. Rather than copying Western prototypes and producing them in existing Soviet factories, the Russians concluded that they would be better advised to buy factories outright from the West and have them built within the U.S.S.R. Thus, as in the early days of the revolution, the Russians again found themselves relying on foreigners to help them with their industrialization.

One other ironic aspect of the foreign economic policy of the U.S.S.R. is worth noting. For years, the Russians have charged that Western imperialists were only interested in foreign aid and trade with underdeveloped countries because this gave the richer countries a foothold and allowed the rich to exploit the material resources of the poorer nations. But because of their economic problems, both domestic and foreign, the Russians have now switched gears. They have announced that henceforth the administrators of Soviet foreign aid should direct their aid to projects which give rise to a compensating flow of raw materials to the U.S.S.R. Afghanistan, Iran and India are good examples where aid has already produced such results. By any other name, this would be called exploitation.

WAS IT WORTH IT?

After 50 years, has the progress made been worth the price? As an economic official from one of the East European countries plaintively complained, "As a youth, I was infatuated with Communism and was put in jail for my beliefs. Now, look what has happened; my country has reintroduced the old capitalist forms. I am beginning to wonder if the revolution and the subsequent sacrifice were worth it."

Economic growth has been rapid, but this is not unique to the U.S.S.R. In fact, Japanese per capita income has been increasing faster than Soviet per capita income. Indeed,

the Russians have not solved all of their economic problems. If anything, they seem to have uncovered an entire barrelful of problems that at one time were thought to be irrelevant to the Soviet experience. Thus, after 50 years the Russians find themselves reemphasizing such concepts as profit and profit-sharing, interest rates and capital charges, as well as rent, advertising, installment credit and overseas investment. Conceivably there could even be some small-scale private enterprise in the future, just as there already has been an increase in the number of workers who have been fired as firms try to increase their productivity.

Fortunately for the Russians, the rate of their economic growth increased again in 1966-1967. Still, those idealists that remain among Soviet Communists must find their enthusiasm somewhat dampened. It is clear that the Soviet economy is no longer uniquely different. In fact, some of the most criticized institutions of the capitalist world have now been reintroduced in the U.S.S.R.

FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY

(Continued from page 229)

ment of some nationalistic goal. If such sentiments are stimulated, the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution may not mark the end of the Soviet threat to the West, as Americans and Europeans have hoped, and the world may again be endangered by Soviet aggression.

In conclusion, the Soviet leaders want to make the fiftieth anniversary a watershed which will end the primary development phase of the economy, lay to rest the Stalinist or totalitarian stage, and mark the beginning of the Soviet Union as a great power with a mature, advancing economy and a new political and social regime. Beyond this they have no clear image. As the elite of a new era, the current leaders in the Kremlin are most unlikely—a group of colorless, elderly bureaucrats grounded in the traditions and struggles of the old system, reluctant to give up power to a new generation. Nevertheless, they are aware of the need for change.

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

(Continued from page 216)

counseled any significant redistribution of Soviet military power deployed against NATO Europe. If the Soviet leaders considered troop withdrawals in Europe while the war in Vietnam continues they would, of course, be vulnerable to Chinese allegations of "collusion" with the United States to ease the European situation and permit the transfer of American troops to Vietnam.⁴⁰

Sensitivity to Chinese criticism, however, probably has had no more than an incidental bearing on Soviet military deployments in Europe. The main factor seems to be that, despite the war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's increasing stake in Asian affairs generally, priority still applies to maintaining the Soviet Union's European power position and its ability to deal with the political and military problems of Europe, not the least of which, in Soviet eyes, is that of keeping a resurgent Germany in check. Indeed, Soviet spokesmen under the new regime have reemphasized that the main focus of Soviet interest continues to lie in Europe where, as the Kremlin sees it, the emergence of a closer United States-Bonn axis within NATO allegedly constitutes the greatest threat to Soviet security.⁴¹

THE WARSAW PACT

The military role of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet policy has changed considerably since the pact was created in 1955, largely as a

diplomatic counter to West Germany's entry into NATO. Originally the pact played little part in Soviet military planning, which was predicated on the assumption that Soviet theater forces would bear the burden of any military undertakings in Europe in which the Soviet Union might become involved. Around 1960-1961, however, Khrushchev instituted a new policy of closer military cooperation with the East European members of the pact, aimed both at improving the collective military efficiency of the Warsaw alliance and at tightening its political cohesion in the face of "polycentric" tendencies in East Europe.

This policy has been continued under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. In particular, the process of joint training and modernization of the East European forces, commensurate with their enlarged responsibilities, has gone forward. Today these forces total over 900,000 men, organized in some 60 divisions, of which about half are at combat strength and readiness, according to Western estimates.⁴² Taken together with the Soviet forces deployed in East Europe—which consist of 20 divisions in East Germany, four in Hungary and two in Poland, plus sizable tactical air elements and tactical missile units—the aggregate Warsaw Pact forces in Europe today represent a rather impressive military potential.

From the Soviet viewpoint, however, the fruits of the new policy course toward the Warsaw Pact have not been entirely sweet. While the military efficiency and capability for joint action of the East European components have been improved, the political aim of tightening bloc unity and cohesion through military integration seems to have gone somewhat awry. Instead of being bound more closely to Soviet interests, the East European regimes have tended to press for a more influential voice in pact matters affecting their own interests, such as the sharing of economic and military burdens, and for the formulation of alliance strategy. Rumania, first to jump the traces in the economic field, also has taken the lead in challenging Soviet control of military affairs.⁴³ Partly perhaps as a response to Rumanian recalcitrance, but probably more

⁴⁰ For a sample of such Chinese allegations, see the *Peking Review*, No. 8, February 18, 1966, p. 10.

⁴¹ See Gromyko's remarks before the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 23, 1966 (*The New York Times*, September 24, 1966).

⁴² *The Military Balance, 1966-1967*, pp. 6-8; Raymond Y. Garthoff, "The Military Establishment," *East Europe*, September, 1965, pp. 13-14.

⁴³ See the present author's *Soviet Military Power and European Security*, RAND Paper P-3429, August, 1966, pp. 38-41. Among reported Rumanian demands was that command of the Warsaw Pact forces be rotated to include non-Soviet officers. A delay of some three months in appointing Marshal Yakubovski to succeed Marshal Grechko as pact commander in July, 1967, tended to bear out speculation that the command issue had arisen within the pact.

because the focus of Soviet political and strategic interest is directed toward Germany, a rather marked regional differentiation has emerged within the Warsaw alliance between "northern" and "southern" tier countries.⁴⁴

In sum, there is growing evidence that the Warsaw Pact is evolving into an alliance beset with the familiar interplay of coalition politics, rather than representing a fully compliant instrument of Soviet policy. It would probably be wrong, however, to jump from this to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has ceased to exercise a predominant role in the affairs of the Warsaw bloc. The residual animosities of the cold war, skillful Soviet play upon East European fears of a resurgent Germany and, above all, the Soviet military presence in East Europe, continue to place limits on the ability of the Warsaw Pact countries to shape their own policies independent of Soviet interests.

POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Finally, to complete this survey of Soviet

military policy today, a few words are in order on the state of political-military relations, an area of recurrent tension in the 50 years of Soviet history,⁴⁵ and one which has taken on new significance in the light of special problems generated by the nuclear age. Broadly speaking, these problems fall into three categories: those of maintaining political control over the armed forces in time of crisis and amidst the hazards which a nuclear-missile world may hold; those of meshing industrial-military planning to cope most effectively with the resource-consuming appetite of modern weapon systems; and those of balancing military influence on Soviet policy formulation against the need of political authorities to call increasingly upon the professional expertise of the military leadership.

Signs that all these questions are alive in the Soviet Union have cropped up under the present regime. An unusual amount of attention, for example, has been given to the command and control problem under nuclear-age conditions, ranging from its technical aspects to the need for creating the "necessary politico-military organs" to insure coordinated leadership of the country in emergencies, taking cognizance of the fact that "modern weapons are such that the political leadership cannot let them escape its control."⁴⁶ Lessons drawn from mistakes committed by the Soviet leadership prior to and in the initial stages of the last war have been cited also to make the point that under modern conditions, especially in the event of war beginning with a surprise blow, the leadership's "correct and timely evaluation of the situation prior to a war, and the reaching of initial decisions" have taken on greatly increased significance.⁴⁷

The enhanced importance of tying together more effectively the economy and the planning and procurement of weapons for the armed forces has been a theme sounded frequently in Soviet writing, often with undertones of civil-military competition for resources.⁴⁸ A suggestion that this issue might be creating pressure for the restructuring of traditional defense ministry arrangements along more civilian-oriented lines than in the past arose following the death of Marshal

⁴⁴ The "northern tier" countries—East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union—have frequently been alluded to by Communist sources as the "first strategic echelon" of the Warsaw Pact. These, of course, are the countries most immediately involved, politically and militarily, with the question of West German aspirations in Central Europe. In the Vlatva joint exercise in Czechoslovakia in September, 1966, Hungary for the first time participated on a token basis with the other northern tier countries, while Poland did not directly take part.

⁴⁵ For an exhaustive treatment of this question, see Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

⁴⁶ See Major General V. Zemskov, "For the Theoretical Seminar: An Important Factor for Victory in War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 5, 1967.

⁴⁷ Marshal A. Grechko, "25 Years Ago," *Voenno-istoricheski zhurnal* (Military-Historical Journal), No. 6, June, 1966, pp. 10, 15.

⁴⁸ An emphatic statement of the need to work out a coordinated "military-economic policy" to insure weapons production in "properly substantiated proportions" appeared in an April, 1967, article by Colonel A. Babin, who also stressed strict party control of such "complex tasks." See "The Party—Leader of the USSR Armed Forces," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 6, 1967. A more recent treatment of the question, with emphasis upon "correct and effective use of resources" to "insure solution of all military-economic tasks," was offered by Colonel Ia. Vlasevich, "Modern War and the Economy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 12, June, 1967, pp. 27–33.

Malinovski, the defense minister, in March, 1967, when there was a spate of rumors in Moscow that his successor might be Dmitri Ustinov, a party civilian with a long career in the management of defense industry. Had Ustinov taken over the post customarily occupied by a military professional with command prerogatives over the armed forces, it seems likely that rather sweeping organizational changes would have followed, perhaps with the effect of giving the professional military even less immediate influence on resource decisions than it now possesses. As it turned out, however, the regime shied away from such a radical step, if it had in fact seriously contemplated it, and after a delay of about two weeks Marshal A. A. Grechko was appointed in April, 1967.⁴⁹ His background as Warsaw Pact commander for seven years and his record as a middle-of-the-roader among the Soviet marshals made him an appropriate choice for the job, especially if the regime wished to avoid a controversy which might have exacerbated the issue of military influence upon Soviet policy.

That this issue, too, remains a live one under the present regime seems to be indicated by the reappearance in print of what was a familiar dialogue in Khrushchev's day between advocates of the case for a growing military share in the formulation of military doctrine and strategy and defenders of the principle of party dominance in all aspects of military affairs. However, it would hardly be warranted to suggest that such sparring over the respective roles of the professional military and the party betokens a serious challenge to the policy prerogatives of the latter. As far as the evidence of the post-Khrushchev period permits one to judge, the Soviet political leadership still enjoys the last word, as was the case during the first half century of Soviet history.

⁴⁹ At the same time Grechko's appointment to succeed Malinovski was announced on April 12, it was also made known that three other officers had been elevated in the defense ministry hierarchy. They were Marshal Yakubovski and Generals S. L. Sokolov and I. G. Pavlovski, men in their middle fifties. This move had the effect of introducing younger blood into the top military echelon, which has been dominated by an over-age generation.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 240)

THE SOVIET MILITARY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY. BY ROMAN KOLKOWICZ. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 429 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$9.00.)

This study examines the relationship between the Soviet Communist party and the military establishment, "the two most powerful bureaucracies, by defining and analyzing the areas where their interests converge and those where they conflict." A thoroughly researched, persuasively analyzed study, it sheds new light on a little-known aspect of the Soviet political scene and on the nature of Soviet politics.

The early chapters trace the party's thinking and policies on the creation of a professional military establishment, and its intricate system of civilian controls, which are intended to ensure the party's preeminent authority. According to Kolkowicz, "the typical Soviet military unit is a microcosm of the tensions and conflicts that have beset the Red Army as a whole since its very creation. These internal tensions have not succeeded in crippling the Soviet military, but they frequently cause inertia and low morale, and their cumulative effect at times is such as to pose a challenge to the Party."

The heart of the book consists of a series of informative chapters on the tensions and rivalries within the military, the efforts of the military to obtain a greater portion of the national income, the dialogue between the party and the military over the role of each in a Communist country, the formation of factions and intraservice loyalties, and the political role of the military in the post-Stalin rivalry for political power. The author identifies sources of current frictions between the party and the military and suggests that these may have far-reaching consequences for the Soviet system and for Soviet foreign policy.

A.Z.R.

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of August, 1967, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

By MARY KATHARINE HAMMOND

Instructor of History and Government, Ohio Northern University

INTERNATIONAL

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Aug. 8—In Bangkok, ministers of Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia sign a 7-point declaration to establish a new association. The major purpose of the association is to "accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavor."

Aug. 29—The 6-year-old Association of Southeast Asia is dissolved by its 3 member nations, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. Its activities will be assumed by the newly-formed 5-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Disarmament

Aug. 24—The 17-nation Geneva Disarmament Conference receives separate but identical texts from the United States and the Soviet Union of a draft treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The article on inspection (an unresolved issue) is left blank.

Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)

Aug. 28—The 11-nation LAFTA meets in Paraguay to discuss turning the 5-year-old organization into a European-style common market.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 3—The United Arab Republic and Israel agree to a U.N. sponsored, one-month cessation of navigation on the Suez Canal.

Aug. 7—The 2,000 Arab-owned business establishments in East Jerusalem are closed as the Arab population stages a general strike against Israeli control.

Aug. 9—Reliable reports from Khartoum disclose that the Sudan has arranged to obtain arms from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

A prominent Arab businessman and a former Jordanian district judge are arrested for having instigated the general strike on August 7 in East Jerusalem.

Aug. 10—Yugoslav President Tito arrives in Cairo for a 3-day meeting with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser; Tito will discuss his 5-point plan for establishing peace in the Middle East.

The Sudanese government announces that Yugoslavia has agreed to help it build a naval base on the Red Sea.

Aug. 14—Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban rejects all proposals for third-party mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He insists that Israel will accept no substitute for direct talks between the Arab nations and Israel.

Aug. 15—A Pan-Arab economic conference of ministers of finance, economy and petroleum opens in Baghdad to devise unified economic action against Western nations that are allegedly pro-Israeli.

U.N. Secretary General U Thant names Ernesto A. Thalmann of Switzerland to study conditions in Jerusalem.

Aug. 18—The first Jordanian refugees begin returning to the west-bank homes they abandoned in June. Out of a total of 1,000 refugees approved by Israel for the day's crossing, some 355 cross.

Aug. 20—The Pan-Arab economic confer-

ence of 13 Arab states ends with a brief communiqué stating that the 29 ministers have agreed on "positive resolutions" to submit to the forthcoming conference of Arab foreign ministers.

Aug. 22—Israel rejects a Jordanian request to extend the August 31 deadline for the return of Jordanian refugees.

Aug. 23—Following two days of conferences with U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, Iran's Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi reportedly arranges to buy a second squadron of the newest U.S. jet fighter planes.

Aug. 29—In Khartoum, 8 of the 13 Arab heads of state are present at the opening session of the conference of Arab leaders. Sudanese President Ismail el-Azhari is nominated as chairman.

Syria and Algeria boycott the session.

Informed sources say the Israeli government has announced that it has extended indefinitely the August 31 deadline for the return of Arab refugees to Israeli-occupied areas on the west bank of the Jordan River.

Aug. 30—At the Arab summit conference in Khartoum, Jordan's King Hussein and U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser tell the other leaders that a "political," or compromise solution should be sought between the Arabs and the Israelis.

Aug. 31—Israel closes the Jordan River bridges used by refugees to return to the west-bank areas; those refugees whose applications have already been approved will be admitted by special arrangement, and families will be permitted to reunify.

At Khartoum, the Arab chiefs of state reach agreement on a \$392-million fund to aid Jordan and the U.A.R.; they agree also that each Arab state is to decide for itself whether or not to embargo oil shipments to the West.

Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS)

Aug. 1—A conference of revolutionaries from 27 Western Hemisphere nations opens in Havana. Former head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

Stokely Carmichael, an honorary delegate, calls for unity between the Latin American peoples and American Negroes; he urges an armed Negro revolution in the U.S.

Aug. 9—The Havana parley approves a resolution condemning Soviet ties with "dictatorships" and "oligarchies" in Latin America.

Aug. 10—The Havana conference ends with a speech by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

United Nations

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 8—A subcommittee of the Special Committee on Colonialism hears a spokesman from Anguilla ask for aid in its drive for self-government.

Aug. 10—In a letter to the U.N. Security Council, the Congo charges that mercenary forces have received help from Portuguese Angola.

Aug. 15—Britain denies that the U.N. has authority to consider Anguilla's case.

Aug. 21—In a letter to the Security Council, Portugal denies that Angola is being used as a base for Congo military operations.

Aug. 25—A spokesman for Anguilla suggests to the U.N. that the island become a territory associated with the U.N. under international protection.

War in Vietnam

Aug. 3—President Johnson announces plans to send some 45,000–50,000 more U.S. troops to Vietnam, bringing the total to 525,000 men by June 30, 1968.

Targets around Hanoi, Haiphong and the demilitarized zone are attacked by U.S. planes in 197 missions.

Vietcong mortar shells hit an oil storage area eight miles from Saigon; 21 Americans are injured.

Aug. 7—In an ambush on the outskirts of Saigon, Vietcong guerrillas shoot down 5 U.S. helicopters.

Aug. 10—The chief of staff of the South Vietnamese armed forces, General Cao Van Vien, says he is convinced that bomb-

ing North Vietnam cannot halt enemy infiltration.

Aug. 14—In the fourth day of intensified bombing of North Vietnam, American pilots for the second straight day strike within 10 miles of the Chinese border.

Aug. 15—In secret testimony last week before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee made public today, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, said recent air raids have hurt North Vietnam severely and should be increased.

Aug. 19—American bombers fly a record 209 missions against North Vietnam.

Aug. 21—The U.S. Pentagon reports that after veering off course 2 U.S. jets have been shot down over Communist China.

Aug. 23—The Soviet Union warns the U.S. that the current intensification of military action in Vietnam will bring reprisals.

Aug. 25—U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara says that bombing alone cannot win the Vietnamese war.

Hanoi announces measures for the evacuation of all civilians except those vital to the city's production and defense.

Aug. 28—As part of an intensified pre-election terrorist campaign, 9 bridges near Saigon are blown up by the Vietcong.

Aug. 31—The U.S. Senate Preparedness Subcommittee calls for extension of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

ALGERIA

Aug. 30—President Houari Boumedienne announces the nationalization of 5 U.S.-owned oil companies.

ANGUILLA

(See also *Intl, United Nations*)

Aug. 4—The islanders repudiate the peace pact negotiated last week to restore Anguilla to the St. Kitts-Nevis Federation. Peter Adams is deposed as president and the Reverend Ronald Webster is installed as his successor.

ARGENTINA

Aug. 25—A controversial and strict anti-

Communist law is signed by President Juan Carlos Onganía.

CANADA

(See also *France*)

Aug. 17—A strike by 5,400 members of the Seafarers Union stops most Canadian shipping on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *United Kingdom, British Territories, Hong Kong; U.S.S.R.*)

Aug. 12—The Peking radio announces the take-over of power by a Maoist revolutionary committee in Tsinghai Province.

Aug. 13—Following an official Soviet protest, Red Guards end their 2-day attack on the Soviet freighter *Svirsk* in Dairen and allow the ship to sail.

Aug. 17—The Soviet embassy in Peking is stormed by Chinese demonstrators. The attack occurs after the government officially charges that seamen aboard the *Svirsk* have been instructed to insult Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Aug. 20—Peking gives the British government a 48-hour ultimatum to rescind the suspension of 3 pro-Communist Hong Kong newspapers.

Following reports of serious clashes in Széchwán Province, Red Guard forces march through Peking in memory of "revolutionary rebels massacred" recently in the province.

Aug. 22—Red Guard forces invade the British compound in Peking, setting buildings afire and attacking Donald C. Hopson, British chargé d'affaires, following his rejection of the Chinese ultimatum of August 20.

An article in *Jenmin Jih Pao* (official party newspaper) charges that yesterday's violation of China's airspace by 2 U.S. jets was a "blatant provocation" and that the Chinese people are ready for combat.

Aug. 23—A Mao Tse-tung aide, Public Security Minister Hsieh Fu-chih, tells Red Guards to stop roaming the countryside looking for fights.

An official report says that some "responsible members" of the Revolutionary Ruling Committee of Kweichow Province have recently been "kidnapped." "Rightists" are accused of burning 3 Red Guards to death in Kweichow, one of the 5 provinces in which Peking contends pro-Mao "power seizures" have taken place.

Aug. 27—A U.S. pilot shot down over China is paraded before a rally of 4,000 peasants in Nanning.

Reports from India say that nearly 500 refugees from Tibet have fled to India to escape a Tibetan Red Guard movement.

Aug. 29—Chinese arriving in Hong Kong report that thousands of residents are fleeing Canton because of continuous fighting between Mao's supporters and his opponents.

Reuters reports from Hong Kong that all personnel of the British mission in Peking are being prohibited from leaving China without the permission of the Chinese foreign ministry.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Kinshasa)

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Rwanda*)

Aug. 2—The U.S. air force flies Congolese soldiers and equipment to Bukavu to aid the army in its attempt to prevent white mercenaries from escaping into Rwanda.

Aug. 4—The U.S. announces it is ending its military airlift in the Congo.

Aug. 10—Rebel white mercenary forces capture Bukavu.

Aug. 14—About 2,000 members of the Popular Revolutionary Movement, the only legal party, sack the Belgian embassy in Kinshasa.

Aug. 24—In an effort to rid the Congo of white mercenaries without further bloodshed, Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko visits Rwanda's President Gregoire Kayibanda to convince him to permit 180 white mercenaries to leave the Congo by way of the Rwanda airfield. Kayibanda urges the Congo to destroy the force.

CUBA

(See also *Intl, OLAS*)

Aug. 7—A hijacked Colombian airliner forced to land yesterday at Havana is permitted to return to Colombia with its 68 passengers.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See also *Germany, Federal Republic of*)

Aug. 11—It is revealed that Ladislav Mnacko, who holds the state's highest award for literature, has denounced anti-Semitism in his country and has gone to Israel in defiance of a government ban.

FRANCE

Aug. 1—The Communist newspaper *L'Humanité* declares its support for President Charles de Gaulle's pledge to "liberate" French-speaking Canada. A similar position is announced by the political bureau of the Unified Socialist party.

Aug. 9—The cabinet gives final approval to major measures of de Gaulle's social program. The most controversial item is a law requiring all firms with 100 or more workers to share excess profits with their employees.

Aug. 17—Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, head of the Independent Republicans, strongly attacks de Gaulle's actions in Canada, his policy during the Arab-Israeli war and his domestic policies. The Independent Republicans hold the balance of power in the National Assembly.

Aug. 23—The cabinet approves a "considerable increase" in aid to Quebec "to help the French of Canada to maintain and develop their personality," in the words of de Gaulle.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Aug. 3—In the first formal tie between Bonn and Prague since World War II, West Germany and Czechoslovakia sign a treaty providing for the exchange of trade missions with limited consular functions.

Aug. 7—Returning from Bucharest, Foreign

Minister Willy Brandt says the Rumanians have promised to support West Germany's entry into the 7-nation Danube Commission.

Aug. 13—Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger leaves for talks with U.S. President Johnson in Washington. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

Aug. 21—Returning from Washington, Kiesinger says his talks with President Johnson made a "significant contribution" to strengthening relations between the 2 nations. He says West Germany and France must work out a "common policy, which would in no case be aimed at the United States."

INDIA

Aug. 27—Violence erupts between Hindus and Muslims in Srinagar, capital of the Indian-held part of Kashmir. A 36-hour curfew is imposed.

IRAN

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*, Aug. 23)

ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

ITALY

Aug. 29—The Italian and Tunisian foreign ministers conclude 3 days of talks. They sign an agreement ending a 3-year-old dispute arising from Tunisian expropriation of Italian property and settling their rival fishing rights.

JAPAN

Aug. 11—In Tokyo, Japan and South Korea conclude the first ministerial conference on economic matters ever held between the two nations. Japan agrees to lend South Korea \$200 million for development programs and to advance \$800 million over a 10-year period.

Aug. 20—The Socialist party removes its pro-Peking leader, Kozo Sasaki, and names as chairman Seiichi Katsumata.

JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 2—A new government is formed under

Premier Saad Jumaa, who retains the post of defense minister. The former foreign minister, Ahmed Toukan, becomes deputy premier; the new foreign minister is Mohammed Adib al-Aamiri.

NIGERIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*, Aug. 21)

Aug. 6—The government orders 30,000 Ibo tribesmen in the federal capital of Lagos to register with the police, in an attempt to reduce terrorist sabotage. The Ibos are predominant in the secessionist Eastern Region (which calls itself Biafra).

Aug. 9—Rebel troops from Biafra invade and seize control of the Midwestern Region. It is reported that the rebels were helped by mutinous federal troops in the Midwestern Region.

Aug. 13—Secessionist forces capture three towns in the Northern Region.

Aug. 15—Government officials take strong action to curb outbreaks of violence against members of the Ibo tribe in Lagos and in Ibadan, capital of the Western Region.

Aug. 17—Officials of Biafra name a Midwesterner from the Ibo tribe as interim military administrator of the Midwestern Region.

Aug. 23—New anti-American feeling erupts in Lagos following the U.S. State Department's expression of regret over the government's purchase of Soviet arms and aircraft. Government spokesmen allege that the U.S. has "failed to prevent" arms sales by private Western dealers to the secessionist regime.

Aug. 30—Reuters reports from London that Sir Louis Mbanefo has left London for the United States with a plan to end the conflict in Nigeria. Mbanefo is legal adviser to Biafran leader Odumegwu Ojukwu.

PERU

Aug. 6—The government rejects a proffered U.S. loan of \$15 million because the accompanying austerity measures, insisted upon by the U.S., are politically too controversial.

RHODESIA

Aug. 23—Major fighting erupts between se-

curity forces and African nationalist invaders from Zambia.

Aug. 26—The government announces that 23 African infiltrators have been killed and 26 captured in recent clashes.

RWANDA

(See also *Congo, Republic of the*)

Aug. 22—President Gregoire Kayibanda refuses to allow white mercenaries holding the east Congolese town of Bukavu to enter Rwanda in order to be flown out of the area. The government instead offers its airfield to the Congolese army to attack the mercenaries.

SPAIN

Aug. 2—A Baptist church in Bilbao is closed by police because the minister has not received written permission from the government to remain open. Under a new religious liberty law, every non-Catholic church must give the justice minister the names of its parishioners and its expense accounts, and submit written requests for permission to invest its funds.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Intl, Disarmament and War in Vietnam; China, People's Republic of*)

Aug. 11—In a note to Peking, the Soviet Union demands that the Chinese release the Soviet freighter *Svirsk* from Dairen and free its captain, who has been arrested after being beaten by Red Guards.

Aug. 12—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin makes a second demand for the release of the *Svirsk* and hints that Chinese refusal may mean a severance of trade relations.

Aug. 18—The Soviet Union denounces an attack on the Soviet embassy in Peking by Red Guards. The protest note charges that the Chinese are engaged in a "hysterical anti-Soviet campaign" apparently aimed at breaking all ties between the 2 countries.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 29—According to *The New York Times*,

reliable diplomatic sources in Washington indicate that Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer and approximately 150 senior army officers have been under arrest since August 25. It is believed that these men were plotting to overthrow President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

(See also *China, People's Republic of*)

Aug. 3—A special tribunal places the responsibility for the October 21, 1966, Aberfan cave-in disaster which killed 116 children and 28 adults entirely on the National Coal Board and 9 regional and local officials.

Aug. 20—Gunmen in a speeding car machine-gun the U.S. embassy. Police believe a group called the "Revolutionary Solidarity Movement," protesting the Vietnamese war and treatment of Negroes in the U.S., may be responsible.

Aug. 21—Following the Red Guard attack on the British embassy in Peking, Britain forbids Chinese diplomats and other officials to leave Britain without official government permission.

Aug. 28—Prime Minister Harold Wilson reshuffles his cabinet, and assumes personal responsibility for economic affairs.

Aug. 29—British police and Communist Chinese clash in two incidents behind the Chinese diplomatic mission in London.

British Territories

Hong Kong (Crown Colony)

(See also *China, People's Republic of*)

Aug. 11—British reinforcements are moved to key points on the Chinese border after a government official and a British officer are held captive for six hours by Chinese workers. Border traffic at Mankamto, the scene of the incident, is halted.

Aug. 20—Britain rejects a Chinese demand that she lift immediately a recent ban on the publication of 3 pro-Communist newspapers and release many journalists arrested on sedition charges.

Aug. 29—Three executives of pro-Communist newspapers are found guilty of sedition and sentenced to 3 years in prison.

South Arabia, Federation of

- Aug. 27—Members of the pro-Egyptian National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen seize government buildings and kidnap Sheik Ali Atif al-Kaladi, head of the government. South Yemen is the name given by Arab nationalists to Aden and the surrounding protectorates.
- Aug. 29—The army refuses Sheik Ali Musaid al-Babakri's request that it take control of the government. Babakri, who yesterday declared himself chairman of the Federal Supreme Council, resigns. The Sultan of Lahej assumes the chairmanship.

UNITED STATES, THE

Economy

- Aug. 14—The Census Bureau estimates that in 1966, the number of persons in the poverty bracket fell below 30 million. Of the nonwhite population, 41 per cent are described as poor (the comparable figure for the white population is 12 per cent).
- Aug. 30—The Chrysler Corporation announces a tentative \$125-price increase on new cars.
- The Republic Steel Corporation announces an increase of 1.8 per cent in the price of steel bars.
- Aug. 31—Despite Administration pleas to hold the line on steel prices, the U.S. Steel Corporation raises prices on one line of steel products.

Foreign Policy

- (See also *Intl, Disarmament, War in Vietnam, Middle East Crisis; Nigeria*)
- Aug. 5—Presidential adviser Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor report to President Lyndon Johnson on their 2-week Southeast Asian trip to discuss the Vietnamese war with allied leaders.
- Aug. 10—The Senate votes to prohibit Export-Import Bank loans or the guaranteeing of private investment by that body to any nation supplying North Vietnam.
- Aug. 11—A group of influential senators from both parties charge that the South

Vietnam military junta has turned the forthcoming presidential elections into a "fraud." They claim that improper election procedures are undermining the basis for American involvement in Vietnam.

- Aug. 13—Fifteen House Republicans urge the Administration to undertake a basic reappraisal of its policy toward NATO.
- Aug. 14—The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, warns Congress that deep cuts in foreign military aid and restrictions on arms credit sales invite further subversion and open aggression by Communist countries.
- Aug. 15—The Senate votes to abolish the Defense Department's authority to sell arms to developing countries on easy credit terms through guarantees of loans by the Export-Import Bank.
- West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger confers in Washington with President Johnson. They agree to full consultation among the Allies before either reduces its European military forces.
- Aug. 17—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins hearings on the extent of U.S. foreign commitments. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach says that Congress authorized the President "to use the armed forces of the U.S. in whatever way was necessary" in Southeast Asia when it passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964.
- Aug. 21—A State Department spokesman criticizes the Soviet Union for supplying arms to the Nigerian government and warns of the risk of introducing an element of "great power competition" in the area.
- Aug. 22—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi of Iran pays an official state visit to President Johnson at the White House. The President praises Iran's recent economic and political gains.
- Aug. 23—The White House announces that 22 prominent political, business and civic leaders have accepted an invitation from President Johnson to go to South Vietnam to observe the forthcoming elections.
- Aug. 27—The House Committee on Government Operations issues the first 3 of a

series of reports on economic aid programs. The "watchdog" committee warns South Vietnam that unless basic social and economic reforms are undertaken, there will be a "reassessment of the U.S. position" in the area.

Aug. 30—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Marko Nikezic delivers a message to President Johnson from Yugoslav President Tito concerning Tito's proposals for a Middle East settlement.

Government

(See also *U.S., Supreme Court*)

Aug. 1—The nation's railroads receive permission from the Interstate Commerce Commission to increase freight rates by 3 per cent.

Aug. 3—President Johnson asks Congress for a 10 per cent surcharge on personal and corporate income taxes to help avoid a projected federal deficit that might exceed \$28 billion.

Aug. 9—The House adopts the President's District of Columbia Reorganization Plan. The measure becomes law automatically and will give Washington, D.C., the structure of an elected city government. City officials will still be appointed by the President.

Aug. 14—The House Ways and Means Committee opens hearings on the President's tax increase request.

Aug. 15—A bill to make it a crime to harm or intimidate persons exercising federally protected civil rights or policemen and firemen quelling a riot is passed by the House.

Aug. 31—The President signs a veterans' Bill of Rights giving increased educational, job training and other benefits to some 5 million veterans.

Labor

Aug. 23—The 5-man presidential board headed by Senator Wayne Morse (D., Ore.), opens hearings in the labor dispute between the railroads and 6 shopcraft unions.

Aug. 24—The United Mine Workers is found guilty of charges that it conspired to violate anti-trust laws. The union is ordered to pay \$1 million in damages to 2 small Tennessee coal companies.

Aug. 25—The United Automobile Workers reports heavy worker votes authorizing strikes against General Motors, Ford and Chrysler if acceptable counter-offers are not received from these firms by September 6. (See *U.S., Labor, Current History*, September, 1967, p. 190.)

Aug. 29—General Motors becomes the first of the auto manufacturers to make a counter proposal to the United Auto Workers. Its wage and fringe benefit proposals would increase workers' benefits from 36 to 44 cents an hour over the next three years.

Aug. 30—The U.A.W.'s top 3 bargaining committees reject Chrysler's, Ford's and General Motors' contracts. The auto companies have offered a 3-year contract with pay and fringe benefit increases of 4 per cent a year (50 to 60 cents an hour); the union wants an increase of at least 6 per cent a year (90 cents an hour) in a 3-year contract.

A strike against one auto company is expected in early September.

Military

Aug. 22—Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton tells a House Armed Services subcommittee investigating the handling of the Detroit riots that the Michigan national guard was "trigger-happy and nervous" and its officers failed to communicate his instructions to their troops. Committee members assert they resent the current "innuendoes" criticizing national guard handling of race riots.

Politics

Aug. 25—George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the American Nazi party, is killed. Arrested for the murder is an ousted Nazi party member.

Aug. 29—Congressman John Bell Williams, a segregationist, defeats moderate William Winter, the state treasurer, in the race for

the Mississippi Democratic gubernatorial nomination.

Race Relations

(See also *Intl, OLAS*)

Aug. 1—The President's Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders begins its first business session. F.B.I. Chief J. Edgar Hoover tells the group that "outside agitators" played a part in the recent riots, but that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has found no relationship between the riots in one city and those in another.

The Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, headed by John McClellan (D., Ark.), is selected to conduct the chief congressional inquiry into the causes and cure of urban rioting.

Attorney General Ramsey Clark denies charges made by Michigan's Governor George Romney that the Administration played politics in delaying the dispatch of federal troops to Detroit during the July riots.

Aug. 2—Vice President Hubert Humphrey says the U.S. must be willing to pay the price of a Marshall Plan to aid impoverished areas.

The Senate Judiciary Committee opens hearings on the House-approved anti-riot bill. It hears police officials of Nashville, Cincinnati and Cambridge, Maryland, who testify that leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (S.N.C.C.) incited the riots that occurred in their areas this summer.

Aug. 3—A Nashville police captain tells the Senate Judiciary Committee that the head of a "liberation school" in his city that teaches "unadulterated hatred" of whites is on the payroll of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Aug. 6—Governor Romney lifts the Detroit state of emergency; the Detroit death toll in the July riots reaches 43.

H. Rap Brown, chairman of S.N.C.C., tells a New York audience that the recent riots are just "dress rehearsals for revolution."

Aug. 7—The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights urges faster, stricter observance of guidelines to speed Southern school desegregation.

Aug. 10—The President's Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recommends a substantial and immediate increase in the number of Negroes in the national guard.

Eight of the Republican governors meet in New York to recommend programs to reduce and handle racial riots. They stress the need for prompt, firm action by security forces at the first sign of civil disorder and charge that the federal government has not allotted sufficient funds for urban poverty programs.

Aug. 14—Floyd McCree, a Negro, resigns as mayor of Flint, Michigan, after the city commission rejects an open housing ordinance.

Aug. 15—Martin Luther King says he plans to "dislocate" Northern cities with massive but nonviolent demonstrations to emphasize the need for larger federal programs to assist urban Negroes.

Aug. 18—A strong force of state police and national guards protects Negro marchers in Louisiana from white attacks.

Aug. 19—H. Rap Brown is jailed in New York after failing to post \$25,000 bail following his arrest on a federal charge of having carried a gun across state lines while under indictment.

Aug. 20—Following a night of rioting, Mayor Richard Lee of New Haven, Connecticut, declares a state of emergency and imposes a curfew.

Aug. 22—H. Rap Brown is released from jail after he posts bond, reduced to \$15,000.

Aug. 24—The Urban Coalition, a convocation of 800 mayors and business, labor, church and civil rights leaders, calls on the government to "reorder national priorities" and develop an emergency program to provide jobs in riot-torn cities.

Aug. 30—After two nights of violence over open-housing demonstrations, Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier proclaims a 30-day ban on demonstrations.

Supreme Court

Aug. 30—Voting 69 to 11, the Senate approves the appointment of the first Negro Supreme Court Justice, Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall. Marshall is replacing Justice Tom C. Clark, who resigned in June.

VATICAN, THE

Aug. 18—Sweeping changes in the Roman Curia are announced by Pope Paul VI. The secretary of state becomes a virtual prime minister with power to coordinate the work of the 9 other curial departments.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*;
U.S., Foreign Policy)

Aug. 3—At the opening of the presidential campaign, 2 civilian candidates pledge that if elected, they will deescalate the war and try to open immediate negotiations with North Vietnam.

Aug. 6—A provincial tour by 18 civilian presidential and vice presidential candidates is halted after their arrival at Dongha airfield, where they find no one to meet them. They charge that the government is sabotaging their campaign by not providing transportation to nearby Quangtri, where 1,000 persons were awaiting them.

Aug. 8—Chief of State Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu, military candidate for president, blames "an inadvertent technical error" for the confusion which resulted in civilian nominees abandoning their tour of the northern provinces.

Aug. 11—Thieu says that if he wins the presidential election he will try to arrange a one-week bombing pause as a goodwill gesture toward peace talks.

Thieu outlines major plans to decentralize the civil administration and reorganize the army to bolster the pacification program.

Aug. 16—The civilian presidential candidates take their campaign to the provinces, 10 days behind schedule.

Aug. 25—Thieu announces plans for a major purge of corrupt and inefficient military officers.

Aug. 27—Premier Nguyen Cao Ky says he does not favor a bombing halt in North Vietnam.

Thieu says he is ready to talk with representatives of the National Liberation Front if they wish "to discuss some problem."

Aug. 30—The 22 election observers, sent by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, arrive in Saigon.

Appearing for a second time with the civilian candidates, Nguyen Van Thieu says that if he is elected he "may even ask for a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam" for longer than a week, contingent on a prior favorable response from North Vietnam.

YEMEN

Aug. 6—Foreign Minister Adbel Aziz Sallam says that the suggestion of the United Arab Republic for a plebiscite to determine the future form of Yemen's government would constitute interference in her internal affairs.

Aug. 29—Reports from Aden claim that Egyptian planes bombed some royalist villages August 27, thus undermining the cease-fire in the Yemeni civil war. In retaliation, the royalists have renewed operations near Sana, the Yemeni capital.

Aug. 31—Sudanese Premier Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub announces that U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia have agreed to the formation of a 3-power committee to oversee the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Yemen. Saudi Arabia also agrees to end her military assistance to the royalists.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See *Intl. Middle East Crisis*;
U.S., Foreign Policy)

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